Chapter 48. DOMESTIC RELATIONS.
Article 1. Marriage.
Legislative Note.—Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 3, adopted November 22, 1929, at an extraordinary session of the legislature, and the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee received on the same day, the amendments made by the revisers in this article are eliminated, and the marriage law as contained in cc. 63, 64 and 149, Code 1923, is inserted, together with consequential amendments made necessary by this change. The arrangement of the various sections, however, closely follows that of the revisers’ report. Moreover, §5, c. 63, Code 1923, relating to marriages between persons belonging to any religious society which has no licensed minister, is omitted as repealed by the last sentence of §3, c. 63, Code 1923, as the same stood after the amendments by Acts 1877, c. 104, and Acts 1882, c. 108 (§12 of this article). Section 12, c. 63, Code 1923, relating to the property of a female under fourteen years of age who marries without the consent of her parents or guardian, is omitted as obsolete.
§1. Age of Consent.—For marriage the age of consent of the male shall be eighteen years, and of the female sixteen years.(Code 1849, c. 109, §3; Code 1860, c. 109, §3; Code 1868, c. 64, §2; 1897, c. 34, §2; Code 1923, c. 64, §2.)
Legislative Note.—Following the arrangement of the revisers, section 2. c. 64, Code 1923, is placed in this article on marriage, rather than the one on divorce, in which chapter it appears in Code 1923. The two words at the beginning of the section are new.
§2. What Relatives a Man May Not Marry; Validation of Certain Marriages.—No man shall marry his mother, grandmother, stepmother, sister, daughter, granddaughter, half sister, aunt, son’s wife, wife’s daughter, or her granddaughter or stepdaughter, brother’s daughter, sister’s daughter, first cousin, double cousin, or wife of his brother’s or sister’s son. If any man has heretofore married his brother’s widow, uncle’s widow, first cousin or double cousin, such marriage is hereby declared to be legal and valid and exempt from penalties prescribed by former laws.(Code 1849, c. 108, §10; Code 1860, c. 108, §9; Code 1868, c. 63, §9; 1872-3, c. 161, §9; 1917, c. 19, §9; Code 1923, c. 63, §9.)
§3. What Relatives a Woman May Not Marry.—No woman shall marry her father, grandfather, stepfather, brother, son, grandson, half brother, uncle, daughter’s husband, husband’s son, or his grandson or stepson, brother’s son, sister’s son, first cousin, double cousin, or husband of her brother’s or sister’s daughter.(Code 1849, c. 108, §11; Code 1860, c. 108. §10; Code 1868, c. 63, §10; 1872, c. 89, §1; 1872-3, c. 161, §10; 1917, c. 19, §10; Code 1923, c. 63, §10.)
§4. Prohibition Continued Notwithstanding Dissolution of Marriage Creating Relationship.—In the cases mentioned in the two preceding sections, in which the relationship is founded on a marriage, the prohibition shall continue in force, notwithstanding the dissolution of such marriage by death or divorce, unless the divorce be for a cause which made the marriage, originally, unlawful or void.(Code 1849, c. 108, §12; Code 1860, c. 108, §11; Code 1868, c. 63, §11; 1872-3, c. 161, §11; Code 1923, c. 63, §11.)
§5. Necessity of License.—Every marriage in this State shall be under a license and solemnized as provided in this article.(Code 1849, c. 108, §7; Code 1860, c. 108, §7; Code 1868, c. 63, §6; 1872-3, c. 161, §6; Code 1923, c. 63, §6.)
Legislative Note.—Following the arrangement of the revisers, the other matter contained in §6, c. 63, Code 1923, is placed in §15 of this article.
§6. By Whom License Issued.—Every license for a marriage shall be issued by the clerk of the county court of the county in which the female to be married usually resides.(Code 1849, c. 108, §1; Code 1860, c. 108, §1; Code 1868, c. 63, §1; 1872-3, c. 161, §1; Code 1923, c. 63, §1.)
Legislative Note.—Following the arrangement of the revisers, the last clause of §1, c. 63, Code 1923, is omitted as covered in §11 of this article.
§7. Facts Required to be Ascertained by Clerk.—It shall be the duty of every clerk of every county court issuing a marriage license to ascertain from the party obtaining the same, and to make a record thereof, before delivering such license, as near as may be, the full names of both parties, their respective ages and their places of birth and residence.(Code 1860, c. 108, §14; 1861, c. 20, §1; Code 1868, c. 63, §14; 1872-3, c. 161, §14; Code 1923, c. 63, §14.)
Legislative Note.—This section includes the first sentence of §14, c. 63, Code 1923. The other matters contained in said §14 are covered in §§9, 10 and 11 of this article.
§8. Consent of Parents, Parent or Guardian.—If any person intending to marry be under twenty-one years of age, and has not been previously married, the consent of the parents of such person, or of the parent living, or, if the parents be living separate and apart, of the one to whom was awarded the custody of such person, or, if there be a guardian entitled to the custody of such person, then of such guardian, shall be given either personally to the clerk of the county court or in writing subscribed by a witness, who shall make oath before the clerk of said court that said writing was signed or acknowledged in his presence by such parents, parent or guardian, as the case may be.(Code 1849, c. 108, §3; Code 1860, c. 108, §3; Code 1868, c. 63, §2; 1872-3, c. 161, §2; Code 1923, c. 63, §2.)
Legislative Note.—The changes made by the revisers to harmonize §2, c. 63, Code 1923, with Acts 1921, c. 80, are adopted. Because the father and mother are equally entitled to the custody of their minor child, with no paramount right in either, (see §7, art. 10, c. 44), and have been since the passage of said Acts 1921, c. 80, the consent of the father or guardian will not be sufficient as heretofore; but the consent of both parents, if living, must be obtained, or if they be living apart, then of the one to whom custody of the minor child was awarded, or of the guardian entitled to such custody.
§9. Form of Marriage License.—The marriage license shall be in form substantially as follows:
Marriage License.
State of West, County of..........................., to-wit:
To any person licensed to celebrate marriages:
You are hereby authorized to join together in the holy state of matrimony, according to the rites and ceremonies of your church or religious denomination and the laws of the State of West Virginia, .................................................................. and ..........................................................................
Given under my hand, as clerk of the county court of the county of..................................., this ........... day of..............................., 19...
……………………………………………………
Clerk as aforesaid.(Code 1860, c. 108, §14; 1861, c. 20, §1; 1866, c. 115, §1; Code 1868, c. 63, §14; 1872-3, c. 161, §14; Code 1923, c. 63, §14.)
Legislative Note.—The other matters contained in §14, c. 63, Code 1923, are covered in §§7, 10 and 11 of this article.
§10. Endorsement and Return of License by Person Solemnizing Marriage.—Every person solemnizing a marriage shall take up the license authorizing such marriage, and on or before the fifth day of each month shall forward to the county clerk issuing such license all such licenses in his possession, with an endorsement thereon of the fact of such marriage and the time and place of celebrating the same.(Code 1849, c. 108, §8; Code 1860, c. 108, §14; 1861, c. 20, §1; 1866, c. 115, §1; Code 1868, c. 63, §14; 1872-3, c. 161, §14; 1921, c. 137, §21; Code 1923, c. 63, §14; c. 150, §28o.)
Legislative Note.—This section includes the last paragraph of §28o, c. 150, Code 1923, which superseded the last sentence of §14, c. 63, Code 1923. The rest of said §28o is in §22, art. 5, c. 16.
§11. Register of Marriages.—The county court of each county shall furnish to the clerk of such county court a suitable book to be used as a register of marriages, which such clerk shall keep in his office among his records, and in which he shall promptly enter a complete record of all matters which he is required by this article to ascertain relative to the right of any person to obtain a marriage license, of each marriage license issued by him, and of the minister’s endorsement certifying that such marriage was solemnized. Such register of marriages shall be properly indexed by the clerk in the names of both parties to the marriage.(Code 1849, c. 108, §§2, 8; Code 1860, c. 108, §§2, 13, 14, 15; 1861, c. 20, §§1, 2; Code 1868, c. 63, §§1, 13, 14, 15; 1872-3, c. 161, §§1, 13, 14, 15; Code 1923, c. 63, §§1, 14.)
Legislative Note.—This section is a composite redraft of the last clause of §1, and the next to the last sentence of §14, c. 63, Code 1923, and also the portion of §15, c. 63, Codes 1916 and 1918, providing for recordation of the minister’s endorsement certifying that the marriage authorized by a particular license was solemnized, and for indexing the register of marriages. The vital statistics act of 1921 (Acts 1921, c. 137) repealed said §15, and hence the same does not appear in the Code of 1923. In repealing this section, however, the legislature failed to substitute any requirement for the keeping of a record of the minister’s certificate of marriage by the clerk of the county court, or for indexing the register. These requirements are reinserted in order that the clerk may more adequately perform his duties as local registrar for the registration of marriages, as provided in §4 of the vital statistics act (art. 5, c. 16). The rest of said §1 is covered in §6 of this article, and the rest of said §14 is covered in §§7, 9 and 10 of this article.
§12. Persons Authorized to Celebrate Marriages.—When any minister of the Gospel shall, before the circuit or county court of any county in this State, or the clerk of any county court therein when neither of such courts shall be in session, produce proof that he is duly licensed as such, and of his being in regular communion with the religious society of which he is a member, and give bond in the penalty of fifteen hundred dollars, such court or clerk may make an order authorizing him to celebrate the rites of marriage in all the counties of the State. And no person, other than a minister who has complied with this section, shall hereafter celebrate the rites of marriage in this State, anything in any act of the legislature or order of any court to the contrary, notwithstanding.(Code 1849, c. 108, §4; Code 1860, c. 108, §4; 1868, c. 38, §4; Code 1868, c. 63, §3; 1872-3, c. 161, §3; 1877, c. 104, §3; 1882, c. 108, §3; Code 1923, c. 63, §3.)
§13. Fee for Marriage.—Any person authorized to celebrate the rites of marriage shall be paid by the husband a fee of at least one dollar in each case.(Code 1849, c. 108, §9; Code 1860, c. 108, §8; Code 1868, c. 63, §7; 1872-3, c. 161, §7; Code 1923, c. 63, §7.)
§14. Record of Marriage Out of State.—If at the time of celebrating any marriage out of this State, either or both of the parties thereto be a resident or residents of this State, a certificate or statement thereof, verified by the affidavit of any person present at such celebration, or a transcript of the marriage record, certified by the custodian of such records, from the state where the marriage was celebrated, may be returned to the clerk of the county court of the county in which the husband resides, if he be such resident, and otherwise of the county in which the wife resides, and an abstract thereof shall be recorded by such clerk in the register of marriages and indexed in the name of both parties.(Code 1860, c. 108, §16; Code 1868, c. 63, §16; 1872-3, c. 161, §16; Code 1923, c. 63, §16.)
Legislative Note.—Section 16, c. 63, Code 1923, is amended by providing for the recording of a transcript of the marriage record from the foreign state, and by substituting for the reference to a specific section, which had been repealed by Acts 1921, c. 137, §22, the words “register of marriages, and indexed in the names of both parties.”
§15. Validity of Marriage Not Affected by Certain Irregularities.—No marriage solemnized by any person professing to be authorized to solemnize the same shall be deemed or adjudged to be void, nor shall the validity thereof be in any way affected, on account of any want of authority in such person, if the marriage be in all other respects lawful, and be consummated with a full belief on the part of the persons so married, or either of them, that they have been lawfully joined in marriage; nor shall any marriage celebrated within this State, between the seventeenth day of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, and the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, be void by reason of the same having been so solemnized without a license.(Code 1849, c. 108, §7; Code 1860, c. 108, §7; 1866, c. 24, §1; Code 1868, c. 63. §6; 1872-3, c. 161, §6; Code 1923, c. 63, §6.)
Legislative Note.—The first clause of §6, c. 63, Code 1923, relating to the necessity for a license, is now §5 of this article.
§16. Marriage of Colored Persons.—All marriages heretofore celebrated between colored persons under license issued by any recorder or clerk of a county court in this State, and all marriages between such persons, whether under such license or not, if the same were consummated in good faith on the part of the persons so married, and such persons were living together as husband and wife on the twenty-eighth day of February, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, shall be deemed valid. Where colored persons prior to the twenty-eighth day of February, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, had undertaken and agreed to occupy the relation to each other of husband and wife, and were cohabiting as such at the time, whether the rites of marriage shall have been solemnized between them or not. shall be deemed husband and wife, and be entitled to the rights and privileges, and subject to the duties and obligations of that relation, in like manner as if they had been duly married by law; and all their children shall be deemed legitimate, whether born before or after the said twenty eighth day of February, eighteen hundred and sixty-six; and where the parties have ceased to cohabit before the said date, in consequence of the death of the woman, or from any other cause, all the children of the woman recognized by the man to be his, shall be deemed legitimate.(1866, c. 102, §1; Code 1868, c. 63, §8; 1872-3, c. 161, §8; 1882, c. 58, §8; Code 1923, c. 63, §8.)
§17. Marriage Out of State to Evade Law.—If any person resident in this State shall, in order to evade the law, and with an intention of returning to reside in this State, go into another state or country, and there intermarry in violation of the provisions of section one, article two of this chapter, and shall afterwards return and reside here, cohabiting as man and wife, such marriage shall be governed by the same law, in all respects, as if it had been solemnized in this State.(Code 1849, c. 109, §2; Code 1860, c. 109, §2; Code 1868, c. 64, §3; Code 1923, c. 64, §3.)
Legislative Note.—Following the arrangement of the. revisers, §3, c. 64, Code 1923, is placed in this article on marriage, rather than the one on divorce, in which chapter it appears in Code 1923.
§18. Penalties for Consanguineous Marriage.—If any person marry in violation of the second or third sections of this article, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, or confined in jail not more than six months, or both, at the discretion of the court. And if any persons, resident in this State, and within the degrees of relationship mentioned in said second and third sections, shall go out of this State for the purpose of being married, with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be as guilty and be punished as if the marriage had been in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage.(Code 1849, c. 196, §3; Code 1860, c. 196, §3; Code 1868, c. 149, §3; 1871, c. 11; 1872, c. 89, §1; 1882, c. 123, §3; Code 1923, c. 149, §3.)
Legislative Note.—Following the arrangement of the revisers, §3, c. 149, Code 1923, is placed in this article where it more properly belongs, rather than in the chapter relating to crimes.
§19. Miscegenation; Penalties.—Any white person who shall intermarry with a negro shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars, and confined in jail not more than one year. Any person who shall knowingly perform the ceremony of marriage between a white person and a negro shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not exceeding two hundred dollars.(Code 1849, c. 196, §§8, 9; Code 1860, c. 196, §§8, 9; Code 1868, c. 149, §§8, 9; 1882, c. 123, §§8, 9; Code 1923, c. 149, §§8, 9.)
Legislative Note.—Following the arrangement of the revisers, §§8 and 9, c. 149, Code 1923, are combined and placed in this article where they more properly belong, rather than in the chapter relating to crimes.
§20. Issuing Marriage License Contrary to Law; Penalties.—If any clerk of the county court shall knowingly issue a marriage license contrary to law, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, or confined in jail not more than one year, or both, at the discretion of the court.(Code 1849, c. 196, §4; Code 1860, c. 196, §4; Code 1868, c. 149, §4; 1872-3, c. 76, §1; 1875, c. 46, §1; 1882, c. 123, §4; Code 1923, c. 149, §4.)
Legislative Note.—Following the arrangement of the revisers, §4, c. 149, Code 1923, is placed in this article where it more properly belongs, rather than in the chapter relating to crimes.
§21. Performing Marriage Ceremony Without License or Authority; Penalties.—If any person knowingly perform the ceremony of marriage without lawful license, of officiate in celebrating the rites of marriage without being authorized by law to do so, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, or confined in jail not more than one year, or both, at the discretion of the court.(Code 1849, c. 196, §5; Code 1860, c. 196, §5; Code 1868, c. 149, §5; 1882, c. 123, §5; Code 1923, c. 149, §5.)
Legislative Note.—Following the arrangement of the revisers, §5, c. 149, Code 1923, is placed in this article where it more properly belongs, rather than in the chapter relating to crimes.
§22. Forfeiture of Minister’s Bond.—If any minister who shall have given bond in order to become authorized to celebrate marriages in this State shall fail to comply with the provisions of the tenth section of this article, the condition of such bond shall be deemed to be thereby broken, and he shall also be subject to the penalties prescribed by law for such failure.(Code 1860, c. 108, §17; Code 1868, c. 63, §17; 1872-3, c. 161, §17; Code 1923, c. 63, §17.)
Legislative Note.—Section 17, c. 63, Code 1923, is amended in conformity with the revisers’ report by striking out the words “or other person” following the word “minister,” since those words referred to persons other than ministers who by former law could be authorized to celebrate marriages (see §§4 and 5, c. 63, Code 1868, repealed by Acts 1877, c. 104); and by substituting the words “penalties prescribed by law” in lieu of the words “penalty hereinafter prescribed,” since all the sections of said c. 63 subsequent to said §17 were repealed by Acts 1921, c. 137, §22.
Article 2. Divorce.
Revisers’ Note.—This article covers all the matter of c. 64, Code 1923, except §§2 and 3 thereof, which are, respectively, §§1 and 17, art. 1 of this chapter.
§1. For What and When Marriages Void.—All marriages between a white person and a negro; all marriages which are prohibited by law on account of either of the parties having a former wife or husband then living; all marriages which are prohibited by law on account of consanguinity or affinity between the parties; all marriages solemnized when either of the parties was an insane person, feeble-minded person, idiot, imbecile, or an epileptic, or was afflicted with a disease making it unlawful for him or her to marry, or was incapable, because of natural or incurable impotency of body, of entering into the marriage state, or was under the age of consent; all marriages solemnized when either of the parties, prior to the marriage, without the knowledge of the other, had been convicted of an infamous offense, or when, at the time of marriage, the wife, without the knowledge of the husband, was with child by some person other than the husband, or prior to such marriage had been, without the knowledge of the husband, notoriously a prostitute, or when, prior to such marriage, the husband, without the knowledge of the wife, had been notoriously a licentious person; shall be void from the time they are so declared by a decree, of nullity.(Code 1849, c. 109, §§1, 6; Code 1860, c. 109, §§1, 6; 1867, c. 17, §6; Code 1868, c. 64, §§1, 5; Code 1923, c. 64, §§1, 5.)
Revisers’ Note.—This section is a redraft of §1 and a part of §5, c. 64, Code 1923. Suits for annulment should be allowed for matters existing at the time of marriage or affecting its validity, while divorces should be allowed for causes arising subsequent to marriage. To preserve this distinction some matters that appear in Code 1923 in the section on grounds for divorce from the bond of matrimony, are moved into this section as grounds for annulment. Said §1 is limited to marriages solemnized in this State, but this restriction is eliminated. Marriages contrary to the policy of this State, whether solemnized in or outside of it, and marriages between parties incapable of marrying from physical causes, whether solemnized in or out of this State, should not be allowed to stand, provided this State has jurisdiction of the parties, or at least one of them, or of the marriage status. In the amended section are included marriages with insane persons, feeble-minded persons, idiots, imbeciles, epileptics or persons afflicted with diseases making it unlawful for them to marry. For the rest of said §5 see §§3 and 4 of this article.
§2. Affirmation or Annulment of Marriage.—When a marriage is supposed to be void, or any doubt exists as to its validity, for any of the causes mentioned in section one of this article, or for any other cause recognized in law, either party may, except as provided in the next succeeding section, institute a suit for annulling or affirming the same, and, upon hearing the proofs and allegations of the parties, the court shall render a decree annulling or affirming the marriage, according to the right of the case. In every such case, and in every other case where the validity of a marriage is called in question, it shall be presumed that the marriage is valid, unless the contrary be clearly proven, and, if the marriage be decreed to be valid, it shall be conclusive upon all persons concerned.(Code 1849, c. 109, §§4, 5; Code 1860, c. 109, §§4, 5; Code 1868, c. 64, §4; Code 1923, c. 64, §4.)
Revisers’ Note.—There are three additions to §4, c. 64, Code 1923: (a) the words “or for any other cause recognized in law,” so that the validity of a marriage may be inquired into wherever doubt exists and it is not a matter included in §1 of this article; (b) the words “except as provided in the next succeeding section,” in order to prevent suits by the persons at fault or who have confirmed the marriage; and (c) the words “and, if the marriage be decreed to be valid, it shall be conclusive upon all persons concerned,” which is probably the rule without the statute, but makes it positive that once a marriage is affirmed, no suit to annul it may be brought.
§3. What Persons May Not Institute Annulment Suit.—A suit for annulling a marriage may not be instituted:
(a) Where the cause is the natural or incurable impotency of body of either of the parties to enter the marriage state, by the party who had knowledge of such incapacity at the time of marriage; or
(b) Where the cause is fraud, force or coercion, by the party who was guilty of such fraud, force or coercion, nor by the injured party if, after knowledge of the facts, he or she has by acts or conduct confirmed such marriage; or
(c) Where the cause is affliction with a disease making it unlawful to marry, existing at the time of marriage, by the party who was so afflicted if such party has subsequent to the marriage become cured of such disease, nor by the person who was not so afflicted if he or she after the curing of the afflicted person has by acts or conduct confirmed the marriage; or
(d) Where the cause is the nonage of either of the parties, by the party who was capable of consenting, nor by the party not so capable if he or she has by acts or conduct confirmed the marriage after arriving at the age of consent; or
(e) Where the cause is lack of consent on the part of either of the parties, by the party consenting or bringing about the marriage; or
(f) Where the cause is that either of the parties has been convicted of an infamous offense prior to marriage, by the other party if, after knowledge of such fact, he or she has cohabited with the party so convicted; or
(g) Where the cause is that the wife was at the time of marriage with child by some person other than the husband, or that prior to the marriage the wife had been notoriously a prostitute, by the husband if, after knowledge of the fact, he has cohabited with the wife; or
(h) Where the cause is that the husband was prior to the marriage notoriously a licentious person, by the wife if, after knowledge of the fact, she has cohabited with the husband.(Code 1860, c. 109, §6; 1867, c. 17, §6; Code 1868, c. 64, §5; Code 1923, c. 64, §5.)
Revisers’ Note.—This section is entirely new down to and including subdivision (e). Subdivisions (f), (g) and (h) are taken from §5, c. 64, Code 1923, on grounds for divorce from the bond of matrimony, for the reason that they are limitations on the rights to annul marriages for causes that are moved from that section into §1 of this article. This new section announces only the well-known principles that the party to a wrong may not invoke the aid of a court to right the wrong, and that a party who has acquiesced in a situation, or confirmed a state of facts, may not ask for relief therefrom. Care is taken not to prevent the bringing of suits to annul marriages, by even the parties in the wrong, in the several cases involving public policy and morals, as for instance, the existence of a former wife or husband, marriages between whites and negroes, between prohibited degrees of relationship, and between persons afflicted with diseases that make it unlawful for them to marry. For the rest of said §5 see §§1 and 4 of this article.
§4. Grounds for Divorce From the Bond of Matrimony.—A divorce from the bond of matrimony may be decreed:
(a) For adultery; or
(b) When either of the parties subsequent to the marriage has, in or out of this State, been sentenced to imprisonment for the commission of a crime which under the laws of this State is a felony, and such sentence has become final, if the suit for divorce be commenced while such party is actually imprisoned under such sentence, or before the parties have again cohabited; and no pardon granted to the party so sentenced, if suit for divorce shall have been commenced before the granting of such pardon, shall restore such party to his or her conjugal rights; or
(c) When either party willfully abandons or deserts the other for three years, to the party abandoned.(Code 1849, c. 109, §6; Code 1860, c. 109, §6; 1867, c. 17, §6; Code 1868, c. 64, §5; Code 1923, c. 64, §5.)
Revisers’ Note.—Matters that are more properly causes for annulment of marriage are moved from this section into the section specifying causes for such a suit. See §1 of this article. Subdivision (b) changes the portion of §5, c. 64, Code 1923, which reads “sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary.” A cause for divorce so stated presents several questions: Does not confinement in the penitentiary mean confinement in the West Virginia penitentiary, and not any prison anywhere? Is not confinement in jail following conviction for a felony excluded? May the suit for divorce be started before the sentence has become final by affirmance on writ of error or by failure to apply for writ of error? May suit for divorce be started notwithstanding the sentence is being reviewed by an appellate court? May the suit for divorce be commenced after the sentence has been served? Will a pardon granted before the suit for divorce is commenced prevent the divorce? See 19 Corpus Juris, “Divorce,” §§77, 78 and 79. It is believed that the change settles such questions. For other portions of said §5, see §§1 and 3 of this article.
§5. Grounds for Divorce From Bed and Board.—A divorce from bed and board may be decreed for any of the causes for which a divorce from the bond of matrimony may be decreed; or
For cruel or inhuman treatment, or reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt, and a charge of prostitution made by the husband against the wife falsely shall be deemed cruel treatment, within the meaning of this paragraph; or
For abandonment or desertion; or
For habitual drunkenness of either party subsequent to the marriage; or
For the addiction of either party subsequent to the marriage to the habitual use of opium, morphine, cocaine, or other like drug.(Code 1849, c. 109, §7; Code 1860, c. 109, §7; Code 1868, c. 64, §6; 1882, c. 60, §6; Code 1923, c. 64, §6.)
Revisers’ Note.—Section 6, c. 64, Code 1923, is amended and rearranged. The amendments allow a divorce from bed and board for any cause for which a divorce from the bond of matrimony may be decreed and for the addiction of either party subsequent to the marriage to the habitual use of narcotic drugs.
§6. Circuit Court to Have Jurisdiction.—The circuit court, on the chancery side thereof, shall have jurisdiction of suits for annulling or affirming marriage, or for divorces.(Code 1849, c. 109, §8; Code 1860, c. 109, §8; Code 1868, c. 64, §7; 1882, c. 60, §7; 1915, c. 73, §7; Code 1923, c. 64, §7.)
Revisers’ Note.—Other matters that appear in §7, c. 64, Code 1923, are put into separate sections. See §§7, 8, 9 and 10 of this article.
§7. Right to Sue to Annul or Affirm a Marriage.—No suit to annul or affirm a marriage shall be maintainable unless at the commence ment of the suit one of the parties is a bona fide resident of this State, except that in the case of a suit to annul a marriage that was performed in this State it shall not be necessary, if a matrimonial domicile has not been established elsewhere, that one of the parties be such a resident.(Code 1849, c. 109, §8; Code 1860, c. 109, §8; Code 1868, c. 64, §7; 1882, c. 60, §7; 1915, c. 73, §7; Code 1923, c. 64, §7.)
Revisers’ Note.—The subject matter of this section is a part of §7, c. 64, Code 1923, but such material changes are made that the section is practically new. As this revision provides for the annulment of such marriages as are contrary to public policy or for causes existing at the time of marriage, it is believed that no other requirement than that one of the parties be a bona fide resident of the State at the commencement of the suit should be prescribed, because it should be the policy of the law to annul such marriages, or to have their validity affirmed, at the earliest practicable time. But in the case of a suit to annul a marriage performed in this State, where a matrimonial domicile has not been established elsewhere, even this requirement of the bona fide residence of one of the parties should not, it is believed, be insisted upon, and an exception is made for such a case. It is the law of this State that creates such a marriage, and the courts of this State, being best qualified to interpret that law, should have the right, if such marriage was performed contrary to that law, promptly to annul the marriage. For other matter that appears in §7, c. 64, Code 1923, see §§6, 8, 9 and 10 of this article.
§8. Right to Sue for Divorce.—No suit for divorce shall be maintainable:
(a) If the cause for divorce is adultery, whether the cause of action arose in or out of this State, unless one of the parties, at the commencement of suit, is a bona fide resident of this State; or
(b) If the cause for divorce is other than adultery, unless one of the parties was, at the time the cause of action arose, a bona fide resident of this State and has been such a resident for at least one year next preceding the commencement of suit; or
(c) If the cause for divorce is other than adultery, unless one of the parties has, since the cause of action arose, become an actual bona fide resident of this State and has continued so to be for at least two years next preceding the commencement of suit, and, in addition, it be shown either that the alleged cause for divorce was recognized, in the jurisdiction in which such party resided at the time the cause of action arose, as a ground for absolute divorce or for the same relief asked for in the suit in this State, or that the alleged cause of action arose more than five years before the commencement of suit: Provided, however, That in any case in which the defendant cannot be personally served with process within this State, such suit shall not be maintainable unless the plaintiff at the time the cause of action arose was an actual bona fide resident of this State and has been such a resident for at least one year next preceding the commencement of suit, or that since the cause of action arose has become such a resident and has continued so to be for at least two years next preceding the commencement of suit.(Code 1849, c. 109, §8; Code 1860, c. 109, §8; Code 1868, c. 64, §7; 1882, c. 60, §7; 1915, c. 73, §7; Code 1923, c. 64, §7.)
Revisers’ Note.—The subject matter of this section is a part of §7, c. 64, Code 1923, but very material changes are made. The former requirement that the plaintiff be “an actual bona fide citizen” and have “resided in the State for at least one year,” was in Vachikinas v. Vachikinas, 91 W. Va. 181, 112 S. E. 316, held to be fulfilled by one who had acquired a domicile in the State and had resided therein the prescribed period, although not a citizen. Hence, in the revision of this section the term “bona fide resident of this State” is used. Also, in the case cited, the requirement of United States citizenship for certain cases is disregarded and its constitutionality questioned. Accordingly, such a requirement is also omitted. The period of residence required by this revised section is made to de pend on the cause for divorce, whether the cause of action arose at a time when one of the parties was a bona fide resident of this State or before becoming such, and whether personal service within this State may be had upon the defendant. Thus, as adultery is almost universally a cause for divorce, no period of residence is required if at the commencement of the suit one of the parties is a bona fide resident of this State and the defendant can be personally served with process within this State. But if the defendant cannot be so served, although the cause alleged is adultery, then, by the proviso, a period of residence is required of the plaintiff,— of one year if the cause of action arose while plaintiff was a bona fide resident of this State, and of two years if the cause of action arose while plaintiff was not such a resident. Where the cause for divorce is not adultery, but arose while one of the parties was a bona fide resident of this State, such party must have been such a resident for at least one year before the commencement of suit in order for the suit to be maintainable. Where the cause for divorce is not adultery, but arose before one of the parties became a bona fide resident of this State, then such party must have become a bona fide resident of this State and have continued so to be for at least two years next preceding the commencement of suit. The provisions of these last two sentences are also subject to the proviso requiring, if personal service cannot be had on the defendant within this State, that the plaintiff fulfill the requirement of residence. Thus, it will be seen, that it is not always the plaintiff alone, as for sometime heretofore, who must fulfill the residence requirement. This change is made for the purpose of affording, relief to the innocent party in a case where a resident of this State marries a person of another state, the parties cohabit after marriage in this State, and cause for divorce occurs on the part of the party who has been a resident of this State before the innocent party is able to fulfill the residence requirement. The privilege of acquiring a domicile for divorce that has heretofore been recognized in this State has not been taken away, but, in order to discourage the coming of persons to this State for the single purpose of procuring a divorce, a longer period of residence is required by this revised section, and also the right to a divorce in such case is conditioned upon the cause for such divorce being recognized, in the jurisdiction from which the party came whose residence in this State gives jurisdiction to the courts of this State, as a ground for absolute divorce or for the same relief that is asked for in the suit in this State, or that such cause of action arose more than five years before the commencement of suit. When, however, as above pointed out, adultery is the cause for divorce, even though the same occurred when neither party was a bona fide resident of this State, it is not necessary that any period of residence on the part of either party be shown, if one of the parties is at the commencement of suit a bona fide resident of this State and personal service can be had on the defendant within this State; otherwise, the plaintiff must meet the residence requirement. For other matter that appears in §7, c. 64, Code 1923, see §§6, 7, 9 and 10 of this article.
§9. Venue of Annulment or Divorce Suits.—The suit for annulling or affirming a marriage, or for divorce, shall, if the defendant be a resident of this State, be brought in the county in which the parties last cohabited, or, at the option of the plaintiff, in the county in which the defendant resides; but if the defendant be not a resident of this State, the suit shall be brought in the county in which the plaintiff resides. In the case of a suit to annul a marriage performed in this State, where neither party is a resident of the State, the suit shall be brought in the county where the marriage was performed.(Code 1849, c. 109, §8; Code 1860, c. 109, §8; Code 1868, c. 64, §7; 1882, c. 60, §7; 1915, c. 73, §7; Code 1923, c. 64, §7.)
Revisers’ Note.—The first sentence of this section is separated from the other matters that appear with it in §7, c. 64, Code 1923, and is slightly changed for the sake of clearness, but its meaning, as construed in Jennings v. McDougle, 83 W. Va. 186, 98 S. E. 162, is retained. The second sentence is new and is put in to provide for annulment suits as now allowed by §7 of this article. For other matter that appears in §7, c. 64, Code 1923, see §§6, 7, 8 and 10 of this chapter.
§10. Order of Publication; Service Out of State.—A decree may be entered in the case upon an order of publication or upon personal service outside the State with the effect of publication, as in other cases in chancery.(Code 1868, c. 64, §7; 1882, c. 60, §7; 1915, c. 73, §7; Code 1923, c. 64, §7.)
Revisers’ Note.—The provision for service outside the State with the effect of publication is new. The provision requiring the publication to be in a newspaper of general circulation in the county is. omitted, as the statute covering orders of publication provides for that. Thus in a divorce case against a nonresident defendant the procedure is just the same as in any other chancery case against a nonresident. The provision that the suit may be brought and prosecuted by the wife in her own name, without a next friend, is omitted. Such provision applied only to the wife’s disability of coverture, and not to that of minority (See Hogg’s Equity Principles, “Divorce,” §498, p. 669), and such disability was long ago removed by the married woman’s statutes. See §19, art. 3 of this chapter. For other matter that appears in §7, c. 64, Code 1923, see §§6-9 of this article.
§11. Procedure; Verification of Pleadings; Necessary Proof; Costs.—Such suit shall be instituted and conducted as other chancery suits, except as provided in this article. Process shall not issue until the bill of complaint shall have been filed, which may be done at any time, notwithstanding rules or a term of court are not then being held. All pleadings shall be verified by the party in whose name they are filed; but the bill shall not be taken for confessed, and whether the defendant answers or not, the case shall be tried and heard independently of the admissions of either party in the pleadings or otherwise; and no decree shall be granted on the uncorroborated testimony of the parties or either of them. Costs may be awarded to either party as equity and justice require, and in all cases the court, in its discretion, may require payment of costs at any time, and may suspend or withhold any order or decree until the costs are paid.(Code 1849, c. 109, §9; Code 1860, c. 109, §9; Code 1868, c. 64, §8; 1915, c. 73, §8; Code 1923, c. 64, §8.)
Revisers’ Note.—There is added the clause “and no decree shall be granted on the uncorroborated testimony of the parties or either of them,” which, using the word “decree” instead of the word “divorce,” in order to include both divorce and annulment suits, is taken from Code Va. 1919, §5106. A similar provision also appears in the Uniform Act of 1907 Regulating Annulment of Marriage and Divorce. The second sentence is also new. It was decided in State v. Waugh, 93 W. Va. 28, 116 S. E. 79, that a divorce suit is pending for the purpose of an order for maintenance and suit money after process has been returned executed and the bill has been filed. So, in order to adhere to the rule that suits and actions are commenced by the issuance of process, but yet to allow a wife, whether plaintiff or defendant, to apply for maintenance and suit money immediately after commencement of the suit, the second sentence is added. Its practical effect is to require divorce suits to be commenced by the filing of the bill of complaint.
§12. Particeps Criminis May Become a Party.—Any one charged as a particeps criminis shall be made a party to a divorce suit, upon his or her application to the court, subject to such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. Some jurisdictions require the particeps criminis to be made a party. But it subserves the ends of justice merely to provide as above. Then such a person may come into the suit and be entitled to all the privileges of a party in furnishing proof, examining witnesses, protecting his or her reputation, etc.
§13. Maintenance of Wife and Children Pendente Lite; Suit Money; Control of Property.—The court in term, or the judge in vacation, may, at any time after commencement of the suit and reasonable notice to the man, make any order that may be proper to compel the man to pay any sum necessary for the maintenance of the woman, and to enable her to carry on or defend the suit in the trial court and on appeal should one be taken, or to prevent him from imposing any restraint on her personal liberty, or to provide for the custody and maintenance of the minor children of the parties, during the pendency of the suit, or to preserve the estate of the man, so that it be forthcoming to meet any decree which may be made in the suit, or to compel him to give security to abide such decree, or to compel the man to deliver to the woman any of her separate estate which may be in his possession or control, or to prevent him from interfering with her separate estate.(Code 1849, c. 109, §10; Code 1860, c. 109, §10; Code 1868, c. 64, §9; 1882, c. 60, §9; Code 1923, c. 64, §9.)
Revisers’ Note.—The words “in the trial court and on appeal should one be taken” are new. In Wass v. Wass, 42 W. Va. 460, 26 S. E. 440, it was decided that suit money may be decreed to the wife to prosecute the appeal even though the decree of the lower court is against her. Also the words “or defend” are new, having been suggested by the case of State v. Waugh, 93, W. Va. 28, 116 S. E. 79. The words “at any time pending the suit” are also changed to “at any time after commencement of the suit and reasonable notice to the man.” In Handlan v. Handlan, 37 W. Va. 486, 16 S. E. 597, it was held that a divorce suit is pending even though process is issued, returned executed, and bill filed all on the same day; and in State v. Waugh, supra, syllabus 2, the court seems to hold that all three elements are necessary to make the suit pending. The wife may need the maintenance and suit money at once and the change here made, together with the change made by §11, will enable her to apply at once, because the bill will be filed upon the commencement of suit, and no husband as plaintiff will be able to forestall the wife’s application by delay in filing the bill.
§14. When Divorce Not to be Granted.—No divorce for adultery shall be granted on the uncorroborated testimony of a prostitute, or a particeps criminis, or when it appears that the parties voluntarily cohabited after the knowledge of the adultery, or that it occurred more than three years before the institution of the suit; nor shall a divorce be granted for any cause when it appears that the suit has been brought by collusion, or that the offense charged has been condoned, or was committed by the procurement or connivance of the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff has, within three years before the institution of suit, been guilty of adultery not condoned.(Code 1849, c. 109, §11; Code 1860, c. 109, §11; Code 1868, c. 64, §10; 1915, c. 73, §10; Code 1923, c. 64, §10.)
Revisers’ Note.—Section 10, c. 64, Code 1023, is considerably enlarged by amending and changing the language following the semicolon so that the latter part of the section applies to divorce for any cause. Formerly all of the section applied only to a divorce for adultery. Such new matter is probably the law, or at least the practice, without the statute, but its statement in the statute can do no harm, and may do good. The Uniform Act of 1907 Regulating Annulment of Marriage and Divorce has a similar section. As adultery, to be cause for divorce, must have been committed within three years before the institution of suit, a new provision requires that adultery on the part of plaintiff to defeat divorce must have been committed within three years before the institution of suit.
§15. Alimony; Custody and Maintenance of Children.—Upon decreeing a divorce, whether from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board, the court may make such further decree as it shall deem expedient, concerning the maintenance of the parties, or either of them; and upon decreeing the annulment of a marriage, or a divorce, whether from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board, the court may make such further decree as it shall deem expedient, concerning the care, custody, education and maintenance of the minor children, and may determine with which of the parents the children, or any of them, may remain; and the court may, from time to time afterward, on the petition of either of the parties, revise or alter such decree concerning the maintenance of the parties, or either of them, and make a new decree concerning the same, as the altered circumstances or needs of the parties may render necessary to meet the ends of justice; and the court may also from time to time afterward, on the petition of either of the parties, revise or alter such decree concerning the care, custody, education and maintenance of the children, and make a new decree concerning the same, as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children may require. In any case where the divorce or the annulment is denied, if the parties are living separate and apart from each other, the court shall retain jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of determining with which of the parents the children or any of them may remain, and of making such order or decree concerning the care, custody, education and maintenance of the minor children, or any of them, as to the court may seem proper and the benefit of the child or children may require; and such order or decree may, from time to time afterward, on petition of either of the parties, be revised or altered, and a new order or decree made, as the circumstances of the parties or the needs of the children may require. For the purpose of making effectual any order or decree provided for in this section the court may make any order or decree concerning the estate of the parties, or either of them, as it shall deem expedient.(Code 1849, c. 109, §12; Code 1860, c. 109, §12; Code 1868, c. 64, §11; 1882, c. 60, §11; Code 1923, c. 64, §11)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is a revision of §11, c. 64, Code 1923, with the following principal changes: (a) The term “dissolution of a marriage” is not used, because such term is thought to have referred to annulment, since the term “divorce” is also used. If the term “dissolution of a marriage” does mean annulment, then it is improper to provide for maintenance of the parties, or either of them, as annulment is intended to dissolve the marriage ab initio, and wipes out any duties of the parties to each other growing out of the marriage status. Therefore, to make a clear distinction between annulment and divorce and what the court may do in each case, the terms “annulment” and “divorce” are used; (b) This section is so phrased as to provide for maintenance of the parties only in case of divorce, and to provide for maintenance of the children in case of both divorce and annulment; (c) A provision is also included which gives the court, as to the maintenance of the parties or of the children, the right to alter or revise the decree, without the necessity of expressly reserving such right in the decree, according to the changed circumstances and needs of the parties or the child ren, and as may be required to meet the ends of justice. In Henrie v. Henrie, 71 W. Va. 131, 76 S. E. 837, it was held that in decreeing a divorce from bed and board and for the payment of alimony, the court has the power to reserve the right to make such changes in the amount as the changed circumstances of the parties and the principles of justice may require; and in Sperry v. Sperry, 80 W- Va. 142, 92 S. E. 574, it was held that upon decreeing a divorce from the bond of matrimony the court should reserve the power subsequently to change the amount of alimony, and that, if the court fails to do so, the error may be corrected on appeal. Without such reservation the court probably can not make a subsequent decree as to alimony, for in Cariens v. Cariens, 50 W. Va. 113, 73 S. E. 332, it was held that a decree of divorce from bed and board allowing alimony to the wife is res judicata as to the alimony, and that the statute gives the court no continued power after decree to make further decree as to the alimony fixed in the decree. With the changes above it is unnecessary to include such a reservation in the decree, the statute itself providing for it, as has been the case heretofore in the matter of the care, custody and maintenance of the children of the parties; (d) The word “education” is added so that the phrase in each instance reads “care, custody, education, and maintenance of the minor children.” The education of the children, if not already included in the meaning of the terms “care, custody and maintenance,” should be provided by the one who is compelled to care for and maintain the children; (e) Section 11, c. 64, Code 1923, gives authority to the court, “whether the divorce be granted or not, if the parties are living separate and apart from each other,” to determine the custody of the children and to decree as to their maintenance. In Lord v. Lord, 80 W. Va. 547, 92 S. E. 749, the court held, after citing the statute, that in a suit for divorce in which the prayer for relief is denied and no divorce granted, there is no jurisdiction to alter the custody of the children of the parties thereto. That decision was apparently directly opposed to the plain language of the statute. Hence, the language of the statute is so changed that such a case is definitely covered; also in this instance power is given to the court to alter and revise the decree afterwards; (f) The provision giving the court power to decree “concerning the estate” of the parties, or either of them, is modified and transposed to the end of the section. The reason for the change is the construction placed upon these words by Reynolds v. Reynolds, 68 W. Va. 15, 69 S. E. 381, in which the court said: “The words ‘concerning the estate’ of the parties, are evidently meant to give the court authority to protect each party in the possession and enjoyment of his or her respective estate, subject to such alimony as may be decreed, and not to authorize the transfer of the legal title to the land by way of alimony. It was said by Judge Brannon, in Goff v. Goff, 60 W. Va. 9, 53 S. E. 769, that this statute is very broad, sufficient, as in that case, to justify the making of a money decree for alimony a lien on the husband’s land, and to enforce the same by a sale of the property. Farther than this we are not disposed by judicial interpretation to extend the statute.” This change merely follows the suggestion made in the latter part of the quotation from that decision, but the court is not limited, it is believed, to the method pointed out by the foregoing quotation, and is left free to follow any other plan that is called for by equity and the circumstances. Of course such provision now has no reference to a wife’s or husband’s dower, for which see §§17 and 18 and the notes thereto on that subject; nor has it any reference to protecting the parties in their separate properties, for which see §19 and the note thereto.
§16. Period and Effect of Divorce From Bed and Board.—A decree of divorce from bed and board shall operate upon the rights and legal capacities of the parties as a decree for a divorce from the bond of matrimony, except that neither party shall marry again during the life of the other.(Code 1849, c. 109, §13; Code 1860, c. 109, §13; Code 1868, c. 64, §12; Code 1923, c. 64, §12.)
Revisers’ Note.—Section 12, c. 64, Code 1923, reads: “In granting a divorce from bed and board, the court may decree that the parties be perpetually separated and protected in their persons and property. Such decree shall operate upon property thereafter acquired, and upon the personal rights,” etc. In Chapman v. Chapman, 70 W. Va. 522, 74 S. E. 661, it was held that: “A decree of divorce a mensa is by section 12, chapter 64 of the Code, a decree of perpetual separation; it operates upon the after acquired property of the parties, and upon their personal rights and legal capacities, the same as a decree a vinculo, except that neither party is permitted to marry again during the life of the other.” It would seem that the court in making such statement did not fully analyze the statute. Without a decree of perpetual separation a divorce from bed and board had the same effect as such a divorce in England. 1 Min. Inst. (4th ed.) 299, 300. In England such, a divorce effected not much more than a physical separation of the parties. 1 Min. Inst. (4th ed.) 297-298. But with a decree of perpetual separation, under the statutes of Virginia and West Virginia, a divorce from bed and board was to operate as a divorce from the bond of matrimony except that neither party could marry again during the life of the other. 1 Min. Inst. (4th ed.) 300. However, as this revision gives the same effect as far as the wife’s and husband’s dower are concerned to both kinds of divorces, allows ample provision to be made to protect the parties as to their separate properties, disabilities of coverture no longer exist, and duties of support may be taken care of by alimony, it is thought proper to adopt the interpretation given by the aforementioned case, and to change the statute accordingly. Also, the word “personal” before the word “rights” is omitted, as, because of the other changes made, there seems to be no reason to retain it.
§17. Decree of Annulment Bars Dower.—When any marriage shall be annulled all rights of either husband or wife to dower shall be thereby barred.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. There has been much discussion and doubt in the Virginias on the effect of annulment and of divorce on dower and curtesy. Prof. Minor says: “When the marriage is determined ab initio (as in the four cases mentioned supra, 2m,) no marital right attaches, and consequently not curtesy nor dower. But in the three cases mentioned supra, Im, where the marriage is void only from the date of the sentence, it would seem that, in the absence of any special provision in the sentence itself, (which it is competent to the court to insert), the marital rights (including curtesy and dower) which have already attached to the existing property of the parties are not impaired. Rights, however, which have not attached, (e.g., that to a distributive share), are barred, nor can any claim arise on the part of either consort, to the after-acquired property of the other. * * * It should be observed, however, that the suggestion that in the three cases in question, the consort, notwithstanding the divorce, is entitled to dower or curtesy, as the case may be, unless the decree of the court, in granting the divorce, has directed otherwise, is quite discredited as to curtesy by the recent case of Porter v. Porter, 27 Grat. 600, and virtually as to dower, by Harris v. Harris, 31 Grat. 33-4; and as to both by Cralle v. Cralle, 79 Va. 188. * * * These authorities are understood to establish the doctrine, in Virginia at least, that in such a case dower and curtesy must be denied.” 2 Min. Inst. (4th ed.) 118. See, also, 1 Min. Inst. (4th ed.) 299, 301-303. In West Virginia marriages are void only from the date of sentence, except in the one instance where the marriage takes place after a divorce within the time prohibited by law or by the decree of divorce, and while there is no decision directly on the point in West Virginia, it is believed to be generally understood that dower and curtesy are barred even as to existing property by a decree of annulment. To settle such question the above section is added. Curtesy is not mentioned therein, because this revision creates in the husband a dower estate and abolishes curtesy. See §§1 and 18, art. 1, c. 43.
§18. Divorce Bars Dower; Compensation to Innocent Party.—When any divorce from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board shall be granted, all rights of either husband or wife to dower shall be thereby barred; but the court when granting any divorce shall, in every proper case, compel the guilty party to compensate the innocent party for any inchoate right of dower, in any then existing property, that may be barred by the divorce; and to secure the payment of such compensation the court may make such compensation a lien upon the real estate of the party liable therefor.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. Just as in the case of annulment, as pointed out in the revisers’ note to the preceding section, the effect of divorce on dower and curtesy has been much disputed in the Virginias, resulting in much confusion from the decisions that pass upon the provision of the statute, alike in both states, that the court upon decreeing the dissolution of a marriage, and also upon decreeing a divorce, whether from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board, may make such further decree as it shall deem expedient concerning the estate and maintenance of the parties, or either of them. (Code 1923, c. 64, §11.) According to a late Virginia case, Gum v. Gum, 122 Va. 32, 94 S. E. 177, a divorce from the bond of matrimony, at common law, could only be granted by the courts for a cause existing at the time of the marriage, and when the divorce was granted for such cause it avoided ab initio the property rights of the parties, so that there was neither dower nor curtesy in property then existing or thereafter acquired, and divorces for supervening causes could only be granted by act of parliament, which then became the law in the case. In the same case, it is said that in Virginia, where the divorce from the bond of matrimony determines the marriage ab initio, no marital right and consequently no right of dower or curtesy attaches, but where it is avoided for a supervening cause, and the marriage is void only from the date of the sentence, in the absence of any special provision in the sentence itself, dower and curtesy, having attached to the existing property of the parties, are not, as to that property, impaired by the divorce. Referring to a divorce from bed and board, it is said in the same case that at common law a decree of divorce from bed and board had no effect on the property rights of the parties, as there was no dissolution of the bond of matrimony, and they still remained husband and wife; and the same is true in Virginia in the absence of any order in the sentence of divorce, unless the separation is made perpetual, and if, in divorce from bed and board, the separation is made perpetual, then it operates like a divorce from the bond of matrimony in respect to after acquired property, barring the claim of dower or of curtesy as to such property. Again, referring to the statute, it is said, in the same case, that while the decree for a divorce from bed and board does not affect the property rights of the parties, if it is silent on that subject, yet the court may make such order with reference thereto as it shall deem expedient, and as to existing property the court has a right to settle the rights of each party in respect to the property of the other, and if need be to extinguish them. See also the discussion in 1 Min. Inst. (4th ed.) 296-304 and in 2 Min. Inst. (4th ed.) 116-122. In West Virginia there is no case definitely saying what the effect of a divorce from the bond of matrimony is on dower and curtesy, but there are some dicta on the subject in Hartigan v. Hartigan, 65 W. Va. 471, 64 S. E. 726. The question, as it relates to the effect of a divorce from bed and board on dower and curtesy, has arisen several times, and the holdings seem to be conflicting and to leave the subject in much doubt. In Hartigan v. Hartigan, supra, it was held that a divorce from bed and board, where the cause was cruelty, not abandonment, with perpetual separation, does not bar the curtesy of the husband, against whom the divorce is awarded, in lands of the wife then existing. Later, in Kittle v. Kittle, 86 W. Va. 46, 102 S. E. 799, it was decided that where a wife is decreed a divorce from bed and board the court cannot lawfully deprive her of her dower or other marital rights in the husband’s estate; and again, in Norman v. Norman, 88 W. Va. 640, 107 S. E. 407, it was held that it is error to deprive a wife, who is granted a divorce from bed and board from her husband because of cruel and inhuman treatment, of her marital rights in his real estate without making any compensation to her therefor though recognizing that the statute authorizes the court, upon decreeing a divorce, whether from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board, to make such further decree as it shall deem expedient concerning the estate and maintenance of the parties, or either of them. The power of the court under the statute has been referred to several times in the cases. In Hartigan v. Hartigan, supra, a case of divorce from bed and board—it was suggested, but not decided, that the court had the power in granting such divorce, to bar, by special order in the decree, the right of curtesy or dower in the existing real estate of the parties, or either of them. Later, in Sperry v. Sperry, 80 W. Va. 142, 92 S. E. 574, a case of divorce from the bond of matrimony—it was decided that the court on decreeing a divorce from the bond of matrimony may provide that the alimony decreed shall be in lieu of dower in the lands of the husband. And still later, in the case of Perine v. Perine, 92 W. Va. 530, 114 S. E. 871, a case of divorce from bed and board—it was held that a provision in the decree to the effect that each of the parties shall take and hold his own real and personal property free from the control and interference of the other, is authorized by the statute, and does not affect the right of dower or curtesy. It seems, therefore, that there has existed much doubt and confusion on the subject of the effect of divorce on dower and curtesy and the power of the court to decree with reference thereto. It is believed that this new section settles the matter definitely, by barring all right of either husband or wife to dower upon the decreeing of either kind of divorce and that no one hereafter taking a conveyance of property from a divorced person will be under any misapprehension as to the effect of the decree, nor will there be, as heretofore, hindrances to the free transfer of property when any owner thereof appears to have been divorced. Any loss to an innocent party to a divorce because of losing any rights of dower, may be taken care of by the court at the time of divorce, and thus full justice done. In view of this new section, the provision giving the court power to decree as to the estates of the parties is omitted from §15, and §19 is added to allow the court to restore to either party his or her property in possession of the other.
§19. Court May Restore to Either Party His or Her Property.—Upon decreeing the annulment of a marriage, or upon decreeing a divorce, whether from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board, the court shall have power to award to either of the parties whatever of his or her property, real or personal, may be in the possession, or under the control, or in the name, of the other, and to compel a transfer or conveyance thereof as in other cases of chancery.
Revisers’ Note.—As there is omitted from §15 the provision giving the court power to decree “concerning the estate of the parties, or either of them,”—except as to such extent as may be necessary to enforce the payment of such alimony as may be decreed under that section—it is deemed advisable to add this section here. In Reynolds v. Reynolds, 68 W. Va. 15, 69 S. E. 381, the court says: “The words ‘concerning the estate’ of the parties (§11, c. 64, Code 1923), are evidently meant to give the court authority to protect each party in the possession and enjoyment of his or her respective estate, subject to such alimony as may be decreed, and not to authorize the transfer of the legal title to the land by way of alimony. It was said by Judge Brannon, in Goff v. Goff, 60 W. Va. 9, 53 S. E. 769, that this statute is very broad, sufficient, as in that case, to justify the making of a money decree for alimony, a lien on the husband’s land, and to enforce the same by a sale of the property. Farther than this we are not disposed by judicial interpretation to extend the statute.” This new section definitely authorizes the court “to protect each party in the possession and enjoyment of his or her respective estate.”
§20. Revocation of Decree From Bed and Board; Merger of Such Decree Into Decree From Bond of Matrimony.—When a divorce from bed and board has been decreed, such decree may be revoked at any time afterwards by the same court by which it was pronounced, under such regulations and restrictions as the court may impose, upon the joint application of the parties, and upon their producing satisfactory evidence of their reconciliation. When a divorce from bed and board has been decreed for any cause other than abandonment or desertion, and two years shall have elapsed from the bringing of the suit wherein such decree is entered, without such reconciliation, and in any case when a divorce from bed and board has been decreed for abandonment or desertion and three years shall have elapsed from the time of such abandonment or desertion, without such reconciliation, the injured party shall be entitled to apply for a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony. Application for such decree shall be made in the same suit wherein the divorce from bed and board was decreed, by petition in writing, duly verified, showing right thereto. No process on such petition shall be necessary, and the matter may be heard at any term of court if thirty days before the commencement of such term the petitioner caused notice to be served on the other parly and the divorce commissioner that such a petition would be filed and that a hearing of the matter would be asked at some certain term of court, to be designated in the notice; and if, also, at least twenty days before the commencement of the designated term the petition be filed in the clerk’s office, which may be done at any time though rules are not then being held. If at the hearing the court shall be satisfied from the evidence then produced, as well as from the evidence in the cause on which the divorce from bed and board was decreed, that the allegations of the petition are fully proved, and shall be of opinion that no reconciliation is probable, a divorce from the bond of matrimony shall be decreed.(Code 1849, c. 109, §15; Code 1860, c. 109, §15; 1861, c. 18, §15; Code 1868, c. 64, §13; 1895, c. 1, §13; Code 1923, c. 64, §13.)
Revisers’ Note.—This section is. a complete revision of §13, c. 64, Code 1923. It provides that three years must elapse between the bringing of the suit for divorce from bed and board and the application under this section, except in the case of such a divorce for abandonment or desertion, where three years must elapse between the abandonment or desertion and the application under this section. The period of time is raised from two to three years, because of the modern tendency to make more strict the requirements for divorce. Three years were required by the statute prior to 1895 when it applied only to cases of abandonment or desertion. The exception with reference to abandonment or desertion was added to make this section consistent with the causes for divorce from the bond of matrimony, and to remove any doubt as to when, after a divorce from bed and board for abandonment or desertion, the application under this section may be made. Also, this section now allows the application for the decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony to be made in the same suit, without the institution of a new suit, which, it was decided in the case of Dixon v. Dixon, 73 W. Va. 7, 79 S. E. 1016, was necessary as the section read before this revision. The clause reading “and this shall apply to such decrees heretofore as well as hereafter entered,” that appeared at the end of the section, is omitted, it being unnecessary and rather indefinite as to what other part of the section it applied. This section is so worded as to make the granting of the divorce from the bond of matrimony obligatory if the proper showing has been made, following the holding in Chapman v. Chapman, 70 W. Va. 522, 74 S. E. 661.
Legislative Note.—The time within which a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony, where the divorce from bed and board has been decreed for a cause other than abandonment or desertion, is restored to two years.
§21. Former Name of Wife May be Restored.—The court upon granting a divorce from the bond of matrimony to a woman may, if there are no children of such marriage, allow her to resume her maiden name, or the name of a former deceased husband.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new.
§22. Restrictions on Remarriage.—When a divorce from the bond of matrimony is decreed, neither party to the marriage so dissolved shall in any case again marry within six months from the date of the decree. The court may, where the divorce is decreed for a cause other than adultery, further prohibit the guilty party from marrying again within a certain time, not to exceed five years from the date of the decree; and where the divorce is decreed for adultery the guilty party shall not marry again within five years from the date of the decree. The foregoing provisions shall not be so construed as to prevent the divorced parties from being remarried to each other at any time. The periods within which both parties are prohibited from marrying again, whether prescribed by law or by the court, shall be stated in the decree; and any marriage contracted by any divorced party, except a remarriage to the person from whom divorced, within the prohibited period, shall be Void, and the party shall be criminally liable the same as if no divorce had been granted. Except where the divorce was granted for adultery, the court may at any time after the expiration of one year, modify or revoke that part of the decree that restrains the guilty party from marrying again, upon it being shown that such person, by reason of his or her life and conduct, since the date of the decree, is entitled to such relief.(Code 1849, c. 109, §14; Code 1860, c. 109, §14; 1867, c. 17, §2; 1915, c. 73, §14; Code 1923, c. 64, §14.)
Revisers’ Note.—This section is a revision of §14, c. 64, Code 1923. The time within which neither party may remarry is raised from six months to one year. It is also provided that if the cause for divorce is adultery the guilty party shall not marry again within five years from the date of decree, and that if the divorce is decreed for a cause other than adultery the guilty party may be prohibited from marrying again for a period not exceeding five years from the date of the decree. Except in the case of adultery the court is given power to modify or revoke, after one year, if the life and conduct of the party justify it, that part of the decree imposing the restraint. It is also provided that all of the periods within which both parties are prohibited from marrying again shall be stated in the decree, for the purpose of advising the parties of the restrictions on their marrying again.
Legislative Note.—The time within which neither party may remarry is restored to six months.
§23. Hearings Before Court; Testimony and Depositions as in Law Actions.—If the process has been served on the defendant sixty days before the first day of the term of court, or if the defendant is a nonresident and has been proceeded against by an order of publication which has been fully completed at least thirty days before the first day of the term, the case shall be placed on the docket for trial and the same shall be tried before the court in chambers, and all witnesses shall appear and testify at the trial the same as witnesses in an action at law; and the law governing the taking and reading of depositions in an action at law shall apply to the depositions in the trial of divorce cases: Provided, That the court may, instead of proceeding with the case under this section, refer the same to a commissioner in chancery, or a special commissioner, as hereinafter provided.(1915, c. 73, §15; Code 1923, c. 64, §15.)
Revisers’ Note.—This section is amended to require the court itself to hear the testimony, the proviso giving the court the option of referring the case to a commissioner being eliminated.
Legislative Note.—The changes made by the revisers are eliminated and the section restored to its original form.
§24. Divorce Commissioner; Duties; Fees.—The circuit court of each county, or the judge thereof in vacation, may in his discretion, appoint a competent attorney in each county as a commissioner in chancery, to investigate divorce cases, who shall be designated as “divorce commissioner.’’ He shall be a man of good moral character, of standing in his profession, and a resident of the county for which he is appointed, and shall, before assuming the duties of such commissioner, take the oath required of other commissioners in chancery; such commissioner shall discharge his duties and hold his office at the pleasure of the court, and may be removed at any time by the court. It shall be the duty of the divorce commissioner to investigate all divorce suits; to appear at all trials and examine witnesses when necessary, and defend the interests of the State; to bring before the court, at the trial, all witnesses necessary to develop the true facts, and generally take all necessary steps to prevent fraud and collusion in divorce cases. For which services he shall be allowed the sum of not less than five dollars nor more than fifteen dollars, to be fixed by the court, which amount shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the case.(Code 1915, c. 73, §16; Code 1923, c. 64, §16.)
Revisers’ Note.—This section changes §16, c. 64, Code 1923, as follows: The position of divorce commissioner is eliminated. This seemed to be a sincere without much benefit to the State. Some of the circuit courts have been referring divorce cases to the divorce commissioner as a special commissioner to take and hear the evidence, which it is thought the statute did not intend, though it possibly admitted of that construction. It is believed the better plan is to allow no reference to a commissioner and to place the duties of the divorce commissioner on the prosecuting attorney or his assistant, and to allow him a fee for such services. This amended section also makes it the duty of the prosecuting attorney to appear in person or by representative at the taking of all depositions. Another reason for placing these duties on the prosecuting attorney is that he obtains through nonsupport, juvenile and other cases considerable information that in many divorce cases will be of much assistance to him in representing the interests of the State, which information any other person acting for the State does not have and will not obtain.
Committee’s Note.—The provisions as to a divorce commissioner are retained in the language appearing in §16, c. 64, Code 1923.
§25. Notice by Plaintiff of Demand for Trial.—The plaintiff shall, in every case, at least thirty days before the first day of the term at which it is expected to try the case before the court, give the divorce commissioner of the county notice in writing that a trial will be demanded. If the plaintiff has not in the bill stated the residence and post-office address of the defendant, he shall furnish it to the divorce commissioner at the time of giving such notice; but if the residence and post-office address of the defendant are unknown to the plaintiff, at the time of giving the notice, an affidavit of this fact, by the plaintiff, delivered to the divorce commissioner with the notice shall be sufficient.(1915, c. 73, §17; Code 1923, c. 64, §17.)
Revisers’ Note.—The prosecuting attorney is substituted for the divorce commissioner in this section to correspond with the change in the preceding section.
Committee’s Note.—See committee’s note to §24 of this article.
§26. Reference to Commissioner in Chancery; Taking of Depositions; Oral Testimony Before Court.—Instead of proceeding with the cause under the provisions of the twenty-third section of this article, the court may, in its discretion, refer it to one of the commissioners in chancery of such court, or to a special commissioner, who shall take and return the testimony in such cause, together with a report of all such facts as the commissioner may be able to obtain as to property rights of the parties, their income, their character, conduct, health, habits, their children, and their respective places of residence from the time of their marriage up to the time of such report, and any other matter deemed necessary by the court, and all such facts so reported shall be considered by the court in passing on the merits of the cause, whether the same be referred to in the pleadings or evidence, or not. If testimony is to be taken in a county other than that in which the cause is pending, the same shall be taken before one of the commissioners in chancery of the circuit court of the county in which the same is taken. If testimony is taken of witnesses residing out of the State of West Virginia, the same shall be taken before some person duly authorized to take depositions in divorce cases in the state where taken. If such depositions are taken out of the county in which the cause is pending, or without the State, the same shall be, by the person taking the same, filed with or forwarded to the clerk or the court wherein such cause is pending, and on receipt of such depositions such clerk shall lay the same before the commissioner to whom such cause has been referred, who shall consider the same in connection with his report hereinbefore mentioned. The person before whom depositions are taken hereunder shall be personally present at the time and place of taking depositions, and no deposition shall be taken or read in the cause unless it appears therefrom that such person was personally present during the taking of the same. It is hereby made the duty of the person before whom such depositions are taken, to see that all witnesses are so examined as to elicit all facts within their knowledge pertaining to the cause. If any person before whom any such depositions are taken certifies falsely as to his presence at the taking of such depositions, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars. The court in which such cause is pending may so refer the same as often as in its judgment justice requires, and may, if if so elect, summon any one to appear before such court, and give evidence with reference thereto, and base its findings on such oral evidence solely. The commissioner shall be allowed for his services the same compensation as is allowed in other chancery causes, and all costs, including stenographer’s fees, shall be taxed as in other chancery causes.(1915, c. 73, §18; Code 1923, c. 64, §18.)
Revisers’ Note.—In accordance with changes that are made in preceding sections, §18, c. 64, Code 1923, is amended so that a reference to a commissioner may be made only to ascertain certain information—not to hear and report on the entire case. Notice of the taking of any testimony or depositions is required to be given a reasonable time in advance to the prosecuting attorney so that he may be present in person or by representative if practicable and he so desires.
Committee’s Note.—See committee’s note to §24 of this article.
Legislative Note.—The changes made by the revisers are eliminated and the section restored to its original form.
§27. Notice of Hearing by Commissioner.—The commissioner to whom any case is referred under the provisions of the previous section shall, before proceeding to execute the requirements of the decree of reference, give to the parties or their attorneys, and the divorce commissioner, at least ten days’ notice of the time and place when and where he will commence proceedings, but if any party is not represented by an attorney and personal service cannot be had on the party on account of absence from the State or nonresidence, then it shall be sufficient to publish the notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the county wherein the suit is pending for such length of time as the court may direct.(1921, c. 88, §20; Code 1923, c. 64, §18a.)
Revisers’ Note.—The words “under the provisions of the previous section” are added to this section, and also the words “and the prosecuting attorney.”
Committee’s Note.—See committee’s note to §24 of this article.
§28. Sealing by Clerk of Evidence.—When a final decree is entered in any suit for annulment of marriage or for divorce the clerk shall immediately seal in a package all the written testimony, exhibits to the testimony, the stenographic notes of the testimony, if any were taken, and all other evidence, and the same shall not be again opened unless by order of the court or the judge thereof in vacation.(1915, c. 73, §19; Code 1923, c. 64, §19.)
Revisers’ Note.—This is a revision of §19, c. 64, Code 1923. Now only the evidence is required to be sealed. No reason for sealing the pleadings, writs, and other papers is perceived. Anyone investigating the validity of the decree, or the property of the parties affected by the decree, was greatly handicapped by the former requirement of sealing “the testimony, bill and other papers.” The change still allows scandalous matter to be concealed from inquisitive parties. The words “court or the judge thereof in vacation” are used in place of the words “court entering such decree, or his successor in office.”
§29. Suit for Separate Maintenance.—Whenever a husband shall, without good and sufficient cause, have failed to provide suitable support for his wife, or have abandoned or deserted her, or if the wife, for such cause as would entitle her to a divorce from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board, is actually living apart from her husband, and such husband is in either case of sufficient ability to support his wife, the circuit court of any county that would have jurisdiction of a suit for divorce between the parties, shall, at the suit of the wife, in chancery, whether or not a divorce be prayed for, decree to the wife as alimony and separate maintenance such sum out of the husband’s earnings and income as the court may determine, considering the circumstances of the parties and their stations in life, and may prohibit the husband from imposing any restraint on her personal liberty, and may free her real and personal property from possession, control or any interest of the husband; and during the pendency of the suit the court, or judge thereof in vacation, shall have the same powers to make such orders as are provided for suits for divorce by section thirteen of this article. Any decree entered in the case shall be effective during such time as the court shall by its order direct, or until the further order of the court thereon, and, upon the petition of either party, the court may, from time to time afterward, revise or alter such decree, or make further decrees, concerning the maintenance of the wife and the interest of the husband in the property of the wife, and the care, custody, education and maintenance of the minor children of the parties, and may determine with which of their parents the children or any of them shall remain.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. In Chapman v. Parsons, 66 W. Va. 307, 66 S. E. 461, it was held that in no suit but one seeking a divorce of some character is there jurisdiction to award alimony pendente lite. In Lang v. Lang, 70 W. Va. 205, 73 S. E. 716, it was decided that a court of equity, independently of proceedings for divorce, on the ground of inadequate remedy at law, may decree maintenance to a wife who has been deserted by her husband, and that the venue of a suit for maintenance without divorce is not governed by the divorce statutes, but by the laws relating to place of suit for the vindication of ordinary legal or equitable rights. In Huff v. Huff, 73 W. Va. 330, 80 S. E. 846, it was decided that a wife who has been abandoned and denied support by her husband may have a decree for alimony without a divorce, and such relief may be granted her in a suit for divorce brought by a husband, on a prayer in her answer therefor as affirmative relief. And in State v. Maxwell, 89 W. Va. 31, 108 S. E. 418, it was held that in a suit by the wife against her husband for separate maintenance and support, not involving divorce, she is entitled to reasonable allowances for suit money and for her support pendente lite. Thus it is believed that the above section, except as to venue, is merely declaratory of the law as announced in the decisions.
§30. Advertising of Any Offer to Obtain Divorces Prohibited.—Whosoever prints, publishes, distributes, or circulates, or causes to be printed, published, distributed, or circulated, any circular, pamphlet, card, handbill, advertisement, printed paper, book, newspaper, or notice of any kind, offering to procure, or aid in procuring, any divorce, or the severance, dissolution, or annulment of any marriage, or, by such publication as above mentioned, offers to engage, appear or act as attorney or counsel in any suit for alimony, divorce, or the severance, dissolution, or annulment of marriage, either in this State or elsewhere, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than one hundred nor more than three hundred dollars, and if the person so convicted be an attorney at law he shall, in addition to the above penalty, be disbarred from practicing as such attorney at law in the courts of this State. This section shall not apply to the printing or publishing of any notice or advertisement required or authorized by any law of this State or orders of any court.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. It is copied from Code Va. 1919, §5116.
Article 3. Property, Rights and Liabilities of Married Women; Husband and Wife.
Revisers’ Note.—This article is a revision of c. 66, Code 1923, omitting because fully covered by other provisions, the matters covered by the following sections of that chapter: §7 relating to married woman’s rights in patents and inventions; §8 relating to married woman’s right to bank deposits; and §9 relating to power of a married woman to hold stock and be an officer and director in a, corporation.
§1. Ownership and Control of Property in Woman; Not Liable for Husband’s Debts.—All property, real and personal, now owned by a married woman, or hereafter owned by a woman at the time of her marriage, or acquired by her as prescribed in this article, and the rents, issues, proceeds and profits thereof, shall be and remain her property in all respects as if she were a single woman, and the same shall in no way be subject to the control or disposal of her husband, nor liable for his debts.(Code 1868, c. 66, §§1, 2; 1891, c. 109, §§1, 3; 1893, c. 3, §§1, 2, c. 43, §1; Code 1923, c. 66, §§1, 2.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is a substitute for §§1 and 2, c. 66, Code 1923, fully covering, it is believed, everything contained in those sections. The word “proceeds” is added, between the words “issues” and “profits,” to make the section more comprehensive. The words “her property” are used instead of the words “sole and separate property,” in order to avoid the inference that a married woman has two kinds of property, that of her own, and that in which her husband has an interest because of the marriage
§2. May Acquire, Hold and Dispose of Property.—Any married woman may take by inheritance or by gift, grant, devise or bequest from any person, and hold, lease, sell, dispose, convey, agree to sell or convey, devise and bequeath, real and personal property, and any interest or estate therein, and the rents, issues, proceeds and profits thereof, in the same manner and with like effect as if she were a single woman; and the same shall not be subject to the control or disposal of her husband, nor liable for his debts; but any such disposition of real estate by a married woman shall not affect her husband’s right to dower therein.(Code 1868, c. 66, §3; 1891, c. 109, §2; 1893, c. 3, §3; 1895, c. 9, §3; Code 1923, c. 66, §3.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is the first part of §3, c. 66, Code 1923, with the following changes: (a) The words “other than her husband,” following the words “from any person,” are omitted. The legislature never intended, it is believed, such words to qualify anything other than the word “grant,” but literally such words, as the statute stood, qualified all the methods by which a married woman was allowed to take. Such words were omitted from the act of 1891, but reinserted by the act of 1893. The reason for their reinsertion is not apparent. They are now left out, with the intention to allow a wife to take even by grant directly from her husband, as she has always been able to do in equity, though not at law. See Humphrey v. Spencer, 36 W. Va. 11, 14 S. E. 410; McKenzie v. Ohio R. Co., 27 W. Va. 306; Cosner v. McCrum, 40 W. Va. 339, 21 S. E. 739; Swiger v. Swiger, 58 W. Va. 119, 52 S. E. 23. See in this connection §7 of this article; (b) The word “hold” is used instead of the phrase “hold to her sole and separate use.” Other parts of the section make the use of the word “hold” fully sufficient; (c) The phrase “convey and devise” is enlarged to read “lease, sell, dispose, convey, agree to sell or convey, devise and bequeath.” It had been decided under the former wording that a wife has the power to lease without her husband’s consent. Smith v. New Huntington General Hospital, 84 W. Va. 281, 99 S. E. 461. The enlarged phrase is more comprehensive and more likely to cover every situation that may arise; (d) The word “proceeds” is added between the words “issues” and “profits,” to accord with §1; (e) Instead of the word “unmarried” the words “single woman,” and instead of the word “control” the words “control or disposal” are used, in order to be consistent with §1; (f) The proviso that required the husband to join in the wife’s conveyance, in order to give effect thereto, except in certain instances, is omitted, this revision placing the wife on an equality with her husband in the ownership, control and disposition of her own property. The part following the second semicolon, however, is added to declare that a conveyance by the wife alone shall not affect her husband’s dower in the real estate conveyed; (g) The second part of §3, c. 66, Code 1923, relating to powers of attorney for the conveyance of real estate of married women, is now a separate section. See §6 of this article.
§3. Effect of Conveyance or Contract to Convey of a Married Woman.—When a married woman signs and delivers any deed or other writing, selling or conveying her own real estate, the same shall operate to pass or convey from such married woman and her representatives all right, title and interest in such real estate that is purported to be sold or conveyed by such deed or other writing, as effectually as if she were a single woman, except that such deed or other writing shall not affect her husband’s dower, if he does not join therein. When a married woman signs and delivers a contract or writing agreeing to sell or convey her own real estate, the same shall operate to bind her to do that which she agrees to do by such contract or writing, and such contract or writing may be specifically enforced. A married woman shall be liable on any covenant contained in any such deed, writing or contract, the same as if she were a single woman.(Code 1849, c. 121, §7; Code 1860, c. 121, §7; Code 1868, c. 73, §6; 1875, c. 67, §6; 1882, c. 149, §6; 1891, c. 23, §6; 1919, c. 65, §6; Code 1923, c. 73, §6.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is a revision of the part of §6, c. 73, Code 1923, relating to acknowledgments. It is put in this article, as a more appropriate place for the subject matter. Formerly, it was the taking and certifying of the acknowledgment of husband and wife that gave effect to a married woman’s deed, but the above gives to the signing and delivery of the instrument the prescribed effect. Also, formerly, this statute provided that the taking and certifying of the acknowledgment should operate to pass the dower interest of the wife even in the case of a mere contract to sell, which surely was not intended by the legislature. That part of the statute relating to dower is now covered by a separate section. See §4 of this article. For that reason the above section, is limited to real estate that belongs to the married woman. Also, the language formerly used seemed too broad, in that it gave to a deed so acknowledged the effect of passing “all right, title and interest of every nature which, at the date of such writing, she may have in the real estate that is sold or conveyed”; whereas the instrument should pass nothing more than what is purported to be conveyed by it. The term “sole and separate property” is not used, for the reason given in the revisers’ note to §1. A married woman is expressly made liable on her covenants, although this result probably followed from the removal of all restrictions on her right to contract.
§4. How Dower and Other Rights in Real Estate of Other Spouse Barred or Relinquished.—When a husband or wife joins with his or her spouse in a deed or other writing purporting to convey any real estate of such spouse, such deed or other writing, when delivered, shall operate to pass or convey from such husband or wife his or her right of dower and any other interest that he or she may have in the real estate of his or her spouse that is purported to be conveyed by such deed or other writing. When a husband or wife joins with his or her spouse in a contract or other writing agreeing to sell or convey any real estate of his or her spouse, such joining shall operate, when such contract or other writing is delivered, to bind such husband or wife to join in whatever conveyance is agreed to be made by such contract or other writing, and he or she shall be compellable to do so.(Code 1849, c. 121, §7; Code 1860, c. 121, §7; Code 1868, c. 73, §6; 1875, c. 67, §6; 1882, c. 149, §6; 1891, c. 23, §6; 1919, c. 65, §6; Code 1923, c. 73, §6.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is a revision of a portion of §6, c. 73, Code 1923. Said §6 provided that joining in a contract to sell would have the same effect as joining in a deed, but it is not believed that the legislature so intended, but only that the wife after joining in a contract to sell should be compellable to carry out the contract. The second sentence is so framed. The section provides in the same way for the release of the husband’s dower in his wife’s real estate, in view of the estate of dower in the husband created by this revision.
§5. Same, by Separate Act of Husband or Wife.—When one spouse has, without the other’s joining in the deed or other writing, conveyed his or her interest in real estate in which the other is entitled to a contingent right of dower or other interest, the spouse not so joining may thereafter, but not before, release or relinquish his or her contingent right of dower or other interest in the same by his or her separate deed, or bind himself or herself to do so by separate contract. When one spouse has, without the other’s joining in the contract or other writing, agreed to sell or convey any real estate in which such other is entitled to a contingent right of dower or other interest, such other spouse may thereafter, but not before, agree to release or relinquish his or her contingent right of dower or other interest in the same by separate contract.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. The idea is taken from Code Va. 1919, §5135.
§6. May Execute Power of Attorney.—A married woman may, by power of attorney duly executed, without her husband joining therein, appoint an attorney in fact for her, and in her name to execute any deed or other writing which she might execute in person; and any deed or other writing so executed by such attorney in fact, in pursuance of such power of attorney, and while the same remains in force, shall be as valid and effectual, in all respects, to convey the title and interest of such married woman, in the real estate thereby conveyed, and to bar her right of dower therein, as if she had in person executed the same.(Code 1868, c. 73, §12; 1875, c. 67, §12; 1895, c. 9, §3; Code 1923, c. 66, §3.)
Revisers’ Note.—Since the act of 1895 the above was a part of §3, c. 66, Code 1923, but it is made a new separate section here. From the Code of 1868 down to 1882, Acts 1882, c. 149, which reenacted c. 73, Code, omitting the above, the same was §12 of c. 73. See Duffy v. Currence, 66 W. Va. 252, 256, 66 S. E. 755. As revised it omits the requirement of acknowledgment in order to give effect to the instrument, thereby making this section consistent with other provisions of this article. Of course, an acknowledgment is necessary, under the recording statutes, to entitle either the power of attorney or the attorney’s deed to be recorded. For the other part of said §3, see §2 of this article.
§7. Conveyances Between Husband and Wife.—Subject to the provisions of section nine of this article, any conveyance or transfer a of property, or any interest therein, executed by either husband or wife to or in favor of the other, directly or indirectly, shall be valid to the same extent as between other persons; but if any such conveyance or transfer shall be directly attacked, by the person making such conveyance or transfer, or his or her heir, devisee or creditor, the party in whose favor it was made shall have the burden of showing that such conveyance or transfer was in all respects lawful and valid.
Revisers’ Note.—This is a new section. Its purpose is to recognize at law certain transactions between husband and wife. The same have been heretofore recognized in equity, and no reason is apparent why they should not be recognized at law. See revisers’ note to §2 hereof. In order to avoid any opportunity for fraud on creditors, the burden of proof, when and if the transaction is directly attacked, is placed upon the husband or wife benefited by the transaction to show that the conveyance or transfer was in all respects lawful and valid. The section is also subject to the provisions of §9 of this article, requiring a note or memorandum of the transaction to be made.
§8. Right to Contract; Liability for Contracts and Debts.—A married person may make contracts with any person, including his wife or her husband, and shall be liable on such contracts, and for his or her debts contracted during coverture, the same as if unmarried, and such liability may be enforced after the coverture has terminated as well as during its continuance; but any contract made between husband and wife shall be subject to the provisions of section nine of this article.(1891, c. 109, §12; 1893, c. 3, §12; Code 1923, c. 66, §12.)
Revisers’ Note.—This section is a modification of §12, c. 66, Code 1923. It allows a married woman to contract with her husband, which heretofore she could do only in equity, and makes it certain that all the property, instead of merely the personal property, of a married woman shall be liable for her contracts and debts. It is provided, too, that a contract between husband and wife shall be subject to the provisions of §9 of this article requiring some written evidence. For other matter that is contained in said §12, see §16 of this article.
§9. Contracts Between Husband and Wife Not Enforcible at Law Unless in Writing.—A contract between a husband and wife shall not be enforcible at law, unless such contract, or some memorandum or note thereof, be in writing and signed by the party to be charged thereby.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. It is limited to actions at law, because it is not desired to affect the established rules of equity as to transactions between husband and wife, resulting trusts, or other matters of equity cognizance.
§10. Presumption of Gift in Certain Transactions Between Husband and Wife.—Where one spouse purchases real or personal property and pays for the same, but takes title in the name of the other spouse, such transaction shall, in the absence of evidence of a contrarv intention, be presumed to be a gift by the spouse so purchasing to the spouse in whose name the title is taken.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. It is intended to equalize the position of husband and wife in such transactions.
§11. Trust for Married Woman May be Extinguished.—Where any person is holding, or who may hereafter hold, as trustee for any married woman, any real or personal property, under any deed of conveyance or otherwise, such married woman shall have the right and be entitled, by the same means and to the same extent as if she were unmarried, to have the trust terminated or extinguished, and to require such trustee to convey to such married woman, by deed or otherwise, all or any portion of such property, or the rents, issues, proceeds or profits thereof, for her own use and benefit.(Code 1868, c. 66, §4; 1891, c. 109, §4; 1893, c. 3, §4; Code 1923, c. 66, §4.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is a modification of §4, c. 66, Code 1923. Instead of providing one specific method for eliminating a trust for a married woman, it is intended by this section to make available to her all the methods and remedies any other person has. Furthermore, by §17, art. 1, c. 36, certain equitable titles are converted into legal titles, and with that section and the above most situations of outstanding legal titles are thought to be cared for. The word “own” is used in place of the words “sole and separate” for the reason given in the revisers’ note to §1 of this article.
§12. Provisions of Law Relating to Trusts Available to Married Woman.—A married woman shall, with respect to any property, real or personal, that may be held in trust for her, be entitled to the benefit of all provisions of law that are available to any other person for whom property is held in trust.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new.
§13. What Restraints or Restrictions May be Placed on Property of Married Woman.—Any property to which a married woman is entitled, either at law or in equity, may not be subjected to any restraints upon alienation or other restrictions that may not lawfully be placed upon the property of persons not married.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new.
§14. Liability of Husband for Wife’s Antenuptial Debts.—Marriage shall not render the husband or his property liable for any contract or debt of the wife made or incurred before marriage; but she shall remain liable for such contract or debt and the same may be enforced against her and her property as if she were a single woman.(Code 1868, c. 66, §10; 1891, c. 109, §10; 1893, c. 3, §10; Code 1923, c. 66, §10.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is a revision of §10, c. 66, Code 1923, omitting the provision for suing the husband and wife jointly for the wife’s antenuptial debts.
§15. Liability of Husband or Wife Upon Conveyance or Transfer of Property from One to Other.—If any property real or personal has been heretofore, or shall hereafter be, conveyed or transferred by either husband or wife to the other, before or after marriage, by reason of any antenuptial contract or otherwise, the grantee or transferee shall be liable for the obligations, whether based on contract or tort, of the grantor or transferor of such property created before such conveyance or transfer, to the extent of the value of the property so conveyed or transferred.(Code 1868, c. 66, §11; 1891, c. 109, §11; 1893, c. 3, §11; Code 1923, c. 66, §11.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above section modifies §11, c. 66, Code 1923. Formerly only the husband was liable to the extent of the wife’s property that was acquired by him, but this section imposes liability when the property of either is transferred to the other for any contract or tort obligations existing at the time of transfer.
§16. Earnings and Property Purchased Therewith.—The earnings of a married woman, and any and all property, real and personal, purchased by her with the proceeds of such earnings, shall in all cases be her own property, and shall not be subject to the control or disposal of her husband, nor liable for his debts.(Code 1868, c. 66, §13; 1891, c. 109, §14; 1893, c. 3, §12; Code 1923, c. 66, §12.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is substantially the same as the first sentence of §12, c. 66, Code 1923. The other part of said §12 related to liability for debts, which is now covered by §8 of this article. The words “sole and separate” are omitted for the reason given in revisers’ note to §1 of this article.
§17. May Engage in Business.—A married woman, separately or with any other person or persons, may carry on any profession, trade, occupation or business; and the professional equipment, stock, property, tools and appliances used in such profession, trade, occupation or business, and the issues and profits thereof, together with her own earnings realized from such profession, trade, occupation or business, shall be her own property, and shall not be subject to the control or disposal of her husband, nor liable for his debts.(Code 1868, c. 66, §13; 1891, c. 109, §13; 1893, c. 3, §14; Code 1923, c. 66, §14.)
Revisers’ Note.—This section makes the following changes: (a) The phrase “living separate and apart from her husband” that followed the words “married woman” is omitted; (b) The words “separately or with any other person or persons” are added following the words “married woman”; (c) The words “profession, trade, occupation or business” are substituted for the words “trade or business” in the several places in the section; (d) The words “professional equipment, stock, property, tools and appliances” are used in place of the words “stock and property”; (e) The words “or otherwise” that followed the word “business” in the phrase that relates to earnings, are omitted, as it is believed that the matter of earnings is completely covered by §16 of this article; (f) Some minor changes in wording, to accord with other sections in this article, are also made.
§18. May be a Member of a Partnership.—A married woman may enter into partnership with any person or persons, including her husband. When a married woman becomes a partner she and her property shall be liable for the partnership debts and obligations to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were a single woman.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. Acts 1891, C. 109, §13, expressly prohibited a married woman from becoming a partner, but this prohibition was omitted from Acts 1893, c. 3, and it has been since an open question as to her right to be a partner. The above section definitely decides the matter.
§19. Actions and Suits by a Married Woman; Joinder of Husband.—A married woman may sue or be sued alone in any court of law or chancery in this State that may have jurisdiction of the subject matter, the same in all cases as if she were a single woman, and her husband shall not be joined with her in any case unless, for reasons other than the marital relation, it is proper or necessary, because of his interest or liability, to make him a party. In no case need a married woman, because of being such, prosecute or defend by guardian or next friend.(Code 1868, c. 66, §12; 1891, c. 109, §§15, 16; 1893, c. 3, §§13, 15; Code 1923, c. 66, §§13, 15.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is a revision of §13 and part of §15, c. 66, Code 1923, and is intended to cover all instances where a married woman may sue or be sued, giving her the same rights and responsibilities as if she were a single woman; and to provide that her husband shall not be joined as a party by reason alone of the marital relation. The part of §15 that dealt with the lien of a judgment and the enforcement of a judgment is taken care of by §21 of this article.
§20. Liable for Torts; When Husband Also Liable.—A married woman shall be liable for her wrongful or tortious acts, whether committed before or after marriage, and whether under the coercion or instigation of her husband or not. Her husband shall not be liable for such acts unless they were done as his agent or by his actual coercion or instigation; and such coercion or instigation shall not be presumed, but must be proved.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. It is largely taken from §57, art. 4, Consol. Laws N. Y. 1909. It changes the law as to the liability of the husband for the torts of a married woman, as laid down in the following cases: Poling v. Pickens, 70 W. Va. 117, 73 S. E. 251; Keller v. James, 63 W. Va. 139, 59 S. E. 939; Gill v. State, 39 W. Va. 479, 20 S. E. 568; and Withrow v. Smithson, 37 W. Va. 757, 17 S. E. 316. See, also, Leros v. Parker, 79 W. Va. 700, 91 S. E. 660. In some of the above cases the supreme court of appeals clearly shows it to be its opinion that since the adoption of the married woman’s law the husband should, in fairness, be absolved of all liability for his wife’s torts in the commission of which he took no actual part.
§21. Lien and Enforcement of Judgment Against Married Women.—Any judgment recovered against a married woman shall be a lien upon her real estate, and such judgment shall be enforcible against her and her property, real and personal, to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were a single woman.(1891, c. 109, §16; 1893, c. 3, §15; Code 1923, c. 66, §15.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is a revision of a part of §15, c. 66, Code 1923. For the other matter in said §15, see §19 of this article.
§22. Liability of Husband and Wife for Purchases and Services.—All purchases hereafter made, or services contracted for, by either husband or wife in his or her own name, shall be presumed, in the absence of notice to the contrary, to be on his or her private account and liability; but both are liable for the reasonable and necessary services of a physician rendered to the husband or wife while residing together as husband and wife, or for such services rendered to their minor child while residing in the family of its parents, and for the rental of any tenement or premises actually occupied by such husband and wife as a residence and reasonably necessary to them for such purpose; and both are also liable when any article purchased by either goes to the support of the family, or for the joint benefit of both, or for the reasonable apparel of the wife and their minor child residing in the family, or for the reasonable support of such wife and child while abandoned by the husband; and both are also liable for the reasonable services of any domestic, laborer or other person from which the family or both husband and wife benefit. It is the duty of the husband to support his family, and his property when found shall be first applied to satisfy any such joint liability, and the wife, for any property of her own that is taken, or for any money that she is compelled to pay, for the satisfaction of any such claim, shall be subrogated to the rights of the creditor whose claim is thus satisfied.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. It is taken in large part from Gen. Stats. Conn. 1918, §5275.
§23. Insurance for Benefit of Married Woman.—Any married woman may, in her own name, or in the name of any third person, with his assent, as her trustee, cause to be insured for her sole use the life of her husband, for any definite period or for the term of his natural life; and any person, whether her husband or not, effecting any insurance on his own life, or on the life of another, may cause the same to be made payable to, or assign the policy to, a married woman, or to any person in trust for her or her benefit; and every such policy, when expressed to be for the benefit of, or assigned or made payable to, any married woman or any such trustee, shall be the property of such married woman, and shall inure to her own use and benefit, and in case of her surviving the period or term of such policy the amount of insurance shall be payable to her or her trustee for her own use and benefit, free from the control, disposition or claims of her husband, and of the person effecting or assigning such insurance, and from the claims of their respective representatives and creditors: Provided, however, That if the annual premium on any such policy shall exceed, the sum of three hundred dollars and is paid by any person with intent to defraud his creditors, an amount equal to the premium so paid in excess of such sum, with interest thereon, shall inure to the benefit of such creditors, subject, however, to the statute of limitations: Provided further, That the company issuing the policy shall be discharged of all liability thereon by payment of its proceeds in accordance with its terms, unless before such payment the company shall have written notice, by or in behalf of a creditor, of a claim to recover for premiums paid with intent to defraud creditors, with specifications of the amount claimed. The amount of any such insurance may be made payable, in case of the death of such married woman before the period at which it becomes due, to her children, or her husband’s children, or to their guardian if under age, for their use, as shall be provided in the policy.(1866, c. 77, §§1, 2; Code 1868, c. 66, §§5, 6; 1891, c. 109, §§5, 6; 1893, c. 3, §§5, 6; Code 1923, c. 66, §§5, 6; 1929, c. 26.)
Revisers’ Note.—This is a combination of §§5 and 6, c. 66, Code 1923, with changes as follows: (a) New provisions are added allowing any person to take out a policy of insurance payable to a married woman or for her benefit, or to assign a policy of insurance to her or for her benefit, and making the insurance money payable in all cases covered by the section her property; (b) A provision is added allowing her to collect the insurance if she survives the period for which taken out, when not taken for life—which was probably intended by the former statute, if not expressly stated; (c) It is provided that whether the insurance be paid for by the husband or any other person the amount of premium above a certain amount is not lost to creditors; and thus is cleared up a doubt that formerly existed, in that it was not certain there whether all the insurance, a part of the insurance or simply a part of the premium, could be claimed by creditors; (d) The amount of premium that may be paid free of the claims of creditors is doubled because of the greatly lessened purchasing power of money in these times. An examination of the statutes of other states shows that as much as one thousand dollars may be exempted, but the more conservative sum of three hundred dollars is adopted; (e) Some verbal changes are also made.
Committee’s Note.—By the second proviso, the provision in c. 26, Acts 1929, as to payments by insurance companies, prior to receiving written notice from a creditor, is inserted.
§24. Husband Not Relieved of Liability to Support Wife; Contract to Alter Marriage Not Authorized.—Nothing in this article contained shall be construed to relieve the husband of his liability to support his wife and family, nor to authorize a husband and wife to contract to alter or dissolve the marriage.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. It may not be necessary, but, in view of the enlarged rights given by this section, it is deemed best to include it.
Article 4. Adoption of Child.
§1. Who May Adopt; Petition to Circuit Court; Consent of Parents.—It shall be lawful for any person not married, or any husband with his wife’s consent, or any wife with her husband’s consent, or any husband and wife jointly, to petition the circuit court of the county wherein he, she or they may reside, or judge of such court in vacation, for permission to adopt any minor child, and also to petition for a change of name of such child: Provided, That if such child be of the age of fourteen years, or over, the written consent of such child to such adoption, acknowledged as a deed is required to be acknowledged, must be obtained and presented with the petition, and also the written consent, so acknowledged, of the parent or parents, if living; or, if both parents should be dead or unknown, or insane, or shall have abandoned the child sought to be adopted, or have been deprived of the custody of the person of such child by law, then, and in such case, the written consent, acknowledged as aforesaid, of the legal guardian of such child or those having at the time the legal custody of the child shall be obtained and so presented. And if there be no legal guardian nor any person having the legal custody of the child, then such consent must be obtained from some discreet and suitable person appointed by the court or judge thereof to act as the next friend of such child in the adoption proceedings.(1882, c. 132, §2; Code 1923, c. 122, §2; 1925, c. 74, §2.)
Revisers’ Note.—Except for using in place of the words “duly acknowledged” the words “acknowledged as a deed is required to be acknowledged,” and several minor changes for an improvement of the language, this section remains as in Acts 1925.
§2. Contents of Petition; Age of Petitioners.—Such petition shall set forth the name, age and place of residence of the petitioner or petitioners, and of the child, and the name by which the child shall be known; whether such child be possessed of any property, and the full description of the same, if any; whether such child has either father or mother, or both, living, and if he, she or they are alive, then the name or names, and place of residence of such father or mother, or, if such be the fact, that the same are unknown to the petitioner or petitioners. The persons petitioning as aforesaid shall be at least fifteen years older than the child sought to be adopted, and the petition shall be duly verified according to law.(1882, c. 132, §3; Code 1923, c. 122, §3.)
Revisers’ Note.—Verbal changes only are made.
§3. Proceedings on Petition; Appointment of Next Friend; Contents of Decree.—Upon the presentation of such petition to the court, or judge thereof in vacation, the same shall be ordered filed with the clerk of such court, and the court or judge thereof shall appoint a day for the hearing of such petition and the examination under oath of the parties in interest. And the court or judge thereof may adjourn the hearing of such petition or the examination of the parties in interest from time to time, as the nature of the case may require; and if it shall be necessary, under the provisions of this article, that a discreet and suitable person shall be appointed to act as the next friend of the child sought to be adopted, then and in that case the court or judge thereof shall order a notice of the petition and of the time and the place when and where the appointment of next friend will be made, to be published in some newspaper of general circulation in the county where such court is located, once a week for two consecutive weeks; and at the time and place so named, and upon due proof of the publication of such notice, the court or judge thereof shall make such appointment, and shall there upon assign a day for the hearing of such petition and the examination of the parties interested. Upon the day so appointed the court or judge thereof shall proceed to a full hearing of the petition and examination of the parties in interest, under oath; and if the court or judge thereof shall be of the opinion from the testimony that the facts stated in the petition are true, and if upon examination the court or judge thereof is satisfied that the petitioner is, or that the petitioners are, of good moral character, and of respectable standing in the community, and of ability properly to maintain and educate the child sought to be adopted, and that the best interests of the child would be promoted by such adoption, then and in such a case, the court or judge thereof shall make a decree reciting at length the facts proved and the name by which the child shall thereafter be known, and declaring and adjudging that from the date of such decree, the rights, duties, privileges and relations, theretofore existing between the child and his or her parent or parents, shall be in all respects at an end, excepting the right of inheritance, and that the rights, duties, privileges and relations, between the child and his or her parent or parents by adoption, shall thenceforth in all respects be the same, including the right of inheritance, as if the child had been born to such adopted parent or parents in lawful wedlock, except only as otherwise provided in this article.(1882, c. 132, §4; Code 1923, c. 122, §4; 1925, c. 74, §4.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is the first part of §4, c. 74, Acts 1925. Verbal changes only are made. The rest of said §4 is covered in the two following sections.
§4. Recording of Decree; Fees of Clerk.—The decree shall be recorded in a book kept for that purpose, and the clerk shall receive the same fees as in other cases in the circuit court.(1882, c. 132, §4; Code 1923, c. 122, §4; 1925, c. 74, §4.)
Revisers’ Note.—The Acts of 1882 required the recording of the “petitions, decrees, testimony and proceedings” and the Acts of 1925 provided for the recording of “petitions and decrees”; but no special reason appears for recording anything more than the decree, as is the case with other judicial proceedings. The rest of §4, c. 74, Acts 1925, is covered in §§3 and 5 of this article.
§5. Effect of Decree as to Relations of Parent and Child and Rights of Inheritance.—Upon the entry of such decree of adoption, the parents of the child, if living, shall be divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the child, and the child shall be free from all legal obligations of obedience or otherwise to the parents, and the adopting parent or parents of the child, shall be invested with every legal right in respect to obedience and maintenance on the part of the child, as if such child had been born to them in lawful wedlock; and the child shall be invested with every legal right, privilege, obligation and relation in respect to education, maintenance, and the right of inheritance in the estate of such adopting parent or parents as if born to him or them in lawful wedlock; except that such child shall not be capable of taking property expressly limited to the heirs of the body of the adopting parent or parents, nor property coming from the lineal or collateral kindred of such adopting parent or parents by right of representation: Provided, That on the death of the adopting parent or parents and the subsequent death of the child so adopted without issue, the property of such adopting deceased parent or parents shall descend to or be distributed among the next of kin of such parent or parents, and not the next of kin of the child adopted: Provided further, That if such adopting parent or parents shall have another child or children, theirs by birth, then, and in that case, the adopted child shall share the inheritance with the child or children born to the adopting parent or parents, and in such case also, such adopted child and such child or children by birth shall respectively inherit from and through each other the property and estate of the adopting parent or parents, as if all had been children of such parent or parents born in lawful wedlock.(1882, c. 132, §4; Code 1923, c. 122, §4; 1925, c. 74, §4.)
Revisers’ Note.—This and the preceding two sections constituted §4, c. 74, Acts 1925. Some changes are made in this section in order to express more accurately the purpose of the statute. Statutes of this kind do not usually give any right to the adopted child to take property from any one other than the adopting parents or children by birth of the adopting parents; nor do they give the adopting parent any right of inheritance from or through the adopted child. See notes in 4 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 881, 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 780, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 572, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 757, and Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 762. Consequently the words “collateral kindred” are changed to “lineal or collateral kindred”; and, in the last proviso, the words “he, she or they” are changed to “such adopted child and such child or children by birth,” and the words “the property and estate of the adopting parents” are added. Just preceding the first proviso the phrase “by right of representation” is used in place of the phrase “by right of inheritance.” An examination of similar statutes in other states leads to the belief that the former phrase is the more accurate. Verbal changes are also made.
§6. Revocation of Adoption by Judicial Proceedings; by Child Itself at Majority.—A parent or guardian of a minor, when a minor is adopted under the provisions of this article, who had no notice of the proceedings, may, at any time within a year after receiving notice thereof, apply by petition to the circuit court in which the petition mentioned in the first section was filed, praying that the adoption may be vacated. The court applied to shall fix a time for a hearing, shall cause notice thereof to be given to the person or persons who were permitted to adopt such minor, and, at the time so fixed, shall hear the petitioner and all parties interested, and may vacate or affirm the adoption in its discretion. Any party interested may appeal to the supreme court of appeals from the decision of the circuit court in the matter, as in cases of appeals in chancery matters. When any minor has been adopted, he may, within one year after becoming of age, sign, seal and acknowledge before proper authority, in the county in which the decree of adoption was made, a dissent from such adoption, and file such instrument of dissent in the office of the clerk of the county court of such county, and such clerk shall record and index the same. Upon the filing of such instrument of dissent the adoption shall be vacated.(1882, c. 132, §5; Code 1923, c. 122, §5; 1925, c. 74, §5.)
Revisers’ Note.—Section 5, c. 74, Acts 1925 was probably copied from the statutes of another state without making provision for the difference in the practice of this State. It spoke of appeals “in matters of probate,” of the “instrument of adoption,” and of a person being “adopted while a minor,” which is always the case in this State. These and other matters are changed, to make the section accord with the other sections of this article.
Article 5. Change of Name.
§1. Petition to Circuit Court; Notice.—Any person desiring a change of his own name, or that of his child or ward, may apply therefor to the circuit court of the county in which he resides, or judge thereof in vacation, by petition setting forth that he has been a bona fide resident of such county for at least one year prior to the filing of the petition, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the new name desired; and previous to the filing of such petition such person shall cause to be published in some newspaper of general circulation in the county, once a week for two consecutive weeks, a notice of the time and place that such application will be made.(Code 1849, c. 168, §1; Code 1860, c. 168, §1; Code 1868, c. 122, §1; 1875, c. 33, §2; 1882, c. 132, §1; Code 1923, c. 122, §1.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is a revision of the first part of §1, c. 122, Code 1923. New provisions allow application to be made to the judge of the circuit court in vacation, and require at least a year’s residence in the county, publication of notice, statement of the cause for the change, and the new name desired. The rest of said §1 is in §§3 and 5 of this article.
§2. Objections to Change of Name.—Any person who is likely to be injured by the change of name of any person so petitioning, or who knows of any reason why the name of any such petitioner should not be changed, may appear at the time and place named in the notice, and shall be heard in opposition to such change.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new.
§3. When Court May Order Change.—Upon the filing of such petition, and upon proof of the publication of such notice and of the matters set forth in the petition, and being satisfied that no injury will be done to any person by reason of such change, that reasonable and proper cause exists for changing the name of petitioner, and that such change is not desired because of any fraudulent or evil intent on the part of the petitioner, the court or judge may order a change of name as applied for.(Code 1849, c. 168, §1; Code 1860, c. 168, §1; Code 1868, c. 122, §1; 1875, c. 33, §2; 1882. c. 132, §1; Code 1923, c. 122, §1.)
Revisers’ Note.—The above is a revision of a portion of the latter part of §1, c. 122, Code 1923. Formerly no requirements were set forth and the making of the change was entirely in the discretion of the court. The rest of said §1 is in §§1 and 5 of this article.
§4. Record of the Change in Office of County Clerk.—When such order is made the petitioner shall forthwith cause a certified copy thereof to be filed in the office of the clerk of the county court of the county where petitioner resides, and such clerk shall record the same in a book to be kept for the purpose and index the same under both the old and the new names. For such recording and indexing the clerk shall be allowed the same fee as for a deed.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. A record of the change should be in the recording office. In Code Va. 1919, §5983, the order is entered in the deed book, and indexed under both the old and the new names.
§5. When New Name to be Used.—When such change has been ordered and a certified copy of the order filed in the office of the county clerk, the new name shall thenceforth be used in place of the former name.(Code 1849, c. 168, §1; Code 1860, c. 168, §1; Code 1868, c. 122, §1; 1875, c. 33, §2; 1882, c. 132, §1; Code 1923, c. 122, §1.)
Revisers’ Note.—The provision requiring the filing of the copy in the office of the county clerk before the new name may be used is added. The rest of §1, c. 122, Code 1923, is in §§1 and 3 of this article.
§6. Penalty for Unlawful Change of Name.—Any person residing in this State who shall change his name, or assume another name, unlawfully, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars, and upon a repetition thereof shall be confined in jail not exceeding sixty days.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. It is taken from Code Va. 1919, §5983.
Article 6. Apprentices.
Revisers’ Note.—See revisers’ note to §1 of this article as to the omission of c. 81, Code 1923.
§1. Apprenticeship Abolished.—No minor may hereafter be bound as an apprentice except as provided in articles three and four, chapter twenty-eight of this Code.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. Apprenticeship created by the binding out of minors to a master is now almost obsolete, and modern conditions of life do not admit of its successful working. This section, therefore, prevents the future binding out of minors, except the binding out of inmates of the Industrial Home for Girls and the Industrial Home for Colored Girls, as provided in arts. 3 and 4, c. 28. Chapter 81, Code 123, is accordingly omitted from this revision.
§2. Former Law Continued as to Subsisting Contracts of Apprenticeship.—Any articles or contracts of apprenticeship in force at the time this Code goes into effect shall continue to be governed by all the provisions of law relating thereto in force on the day before this Code goes into effect.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. It continues in effect the former law as to all subsisting articles or contracts of apprenticeship.
§3. How Apprenticeship May be Terminated.—Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding section, the circuit court of the county wherein any apprentice may reside may, on petition of a parent or guardian of such apprentice, or of a probation officer, or an agent of the state board of children’s guardians, or of any other person, on behalf of such apprentice, after reasonable notice to such master, or his personal representative, or assignee, and when the circumstances require it, or when it may be to the best interest of such apprentice, discharge such apprentice from his apprenticeship, and enter such order for his disposition or custody as to the court shall seem proper.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new. It provides means for terminating any existing apprenticeship where circumstances exist requiring such action, or the best interest of the apprentice may make such action desirable.
Article 7. Maintenance of Illegitimate Children.
§1. How Accusation of Paternity Made; Warrant; Recognizance.—Any unmarried wom an may go before a justice of the county in which she resides and accuse any person of being the father of a bastard child of which she has been delivered. Such justice shall examine her under oath, and reduce her examination to writing and sign it. On such examination, unless the child be three years old or upwards, the justice shall issue a warrant, directed to the sheriff of, or a constable in, any county where the accused may be, requiring him to be apprehended and taken before a justice of the county in which he may be found; and it shall be the duty of such justice to require the accused to enter into a recognizance, with one or more good securities, in a sum not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, conditioned for his appearance at the next term of the circuit court of the county in which such warrant issued, to answer such charge, and to abide by and perform the order of the court in relation thereto. If a married woman live separate and apart from her husband for the space of one year or more, and shall not at any time during such separation, cohabit with such husband she may, if she be delivered of a child at any time after such one year, and while such separation continues, accuse any person, other than her husband, of being the father of such child, in like manner, and the same proceedings shall thereupon be had, as if she were an unmarried woman.(Code 1849, c. 125, §1; Code 1860, c. 125, §1; 1863, c. 60, §1; 1867, c. 56, §1; Code 1868, c. 80, §1; 1872-3, c. 150, §1; 1882, c. 54, §1; Code 1923, c. 80, §1.)
Revisers’ Note.—Section 1, c. 80, Code 1923, is changed to require of the complainant merely residence in the county, instead of residence therein “for the preceding year,” and to provide for a recognizance in a larger sum.
§2. Recognizance Unaffected by Continuance.—Should the court continue the case at the first or any subsequent term, the recognizance shall continue in force until the final judgment, unless the accused, if a new recognizance be required, shall give the same or be committed to jail.(Code 1849, c. 125, §2; Code 1860, c. 125, §2; Code 1868, c. 80, §2; 1872-3, c. 150, §2; 1882, c. 54, §2; Code 1923, c. 80, §2.)
§3. Proceedings in Name of Woman or County Court.—After such accusation shall have been made, proceedings thereupon may be had in the name of the woman or, if the court so order, in the name of the county court.(Code 1849, c. 125, §3; Code 1860, c. 125, §3; Code 1868, c. 80, §3; 1872-3, c. 150, §3; 1882, c. 54, §3; Code 1923, c. 80, §3.)
§4. Proceedings in Circuit Court.—If the accused appear and plead not guilty, the issue shall be tried by a jury, if not waived by the parties, and, if the accused fail to appear, the court shall, unless a jury is demanded by the plaintiff, try and determine the issue; and if, in either event, the accused be found guilty, the court shall order him to pay to the county court, or as the court may otherwise direct, for the maintenance, education, and support of the child, such sums as the court may deem proper for each year, fixing such times of payment as the court may deem proper, until such time as the court may appoint, unless the child shall sooner die, and, if such father be then in court, the court shall order him to give bond in such penalty and with such sureties as the court may deem sufficient for the performance of such order; and shall order him to jail until such bond be given in the court or filed in the office of the clerk thereof, with sufficient sureties to be approved by the court or clerk, or until the woman and the county court consent to his discharge, or until he be discharged by an order of the circuit court, the court being satisfied that the prisoner cannot pay the judgment of the court or give the bond required, or until he be otherwise legally discharged; and, if he be found not guilty, he shall be discharged, and shall recover his costs against the party in whose name the proceedings are had. In event such judgment is rendered by the court against such father upon a trial had on the nonappearance of such father and in his absence, such judgment shall be rendered against him and his sureties upon his bond given before the justice, required by section one of this article, and the court may likewise issue an attachment for such father to bring him into court, there to be dealt with as prescribed by this article, as if judgment had been rendered against him when present in court and upon a finding of a jury that he is guilty as charged in the warrant after trial had in his presence.(Code 1849, c. 125, §5; Code 1860, c. 125, §5; 1865, c. 9, §1; Code 1868, c. 80, §4; 1872-3, c. 150, §4; 1875, c. 52, §4; 1882, c. 54, §4; Code 1923, c. 80, §4.)
Revisers’ Note.—This is a redraft of §4, c. 80, Code 1923, with provisions added (a) to provide for trial in the absence of the accused and in such case judgment against the sureties on the bond given before the justice, and for an attachment for the accused; (b) to allow payment as the court may direct; and (c) to allow the court to fix times for payment.
§5. Power in Court to Change Payments.—Until the child shall reach the age of twenty–one years such circuit court shall have and retain jurisdiction of any such proceedings to make, when circumstances justify it, any further order or orders increasing or decreasing the amount of money to be paid for the maintenance, education and support of the child, or requiring a new or additional bond.
Revisers’ Note.—This section is new and abrogates the rule in Barbour County Court v. O’Neal, 42 W. Va. 295, 26 S. E. 182.
§6. Recovery on Bonds.—As often as the condition of any bond or bonds given as provided in this article is broken, a motion may be made before the circuit court of the county and judgment may be given in the name of the county court, against such father and his sureties on any bond or bonds in force at the time of any breach, and against his and their personal representatives, for the money due, with lawful interest thereon from the time or times when the same ought to have been paid.(Code 1849, c. 125, §6; Code 1860, c. 125, §6; Code 1868, c. 80, §5; 1872-3, c. 150, §5; 1882, c. 54, §5; Code 1923, c. 80, §5.)
Revisers’ Note.—Section 5, c. 80, Code 1923, is changed to include more than one bond, should any new or additional bond be required and given by virtue of the provisions of the next preceding section.
§7. Prosecuting Attorney to Appear for Woman or County Court.—The prosecuting attorney for the county shall appear on behalf of the woman or of the county court in every case under this article, and if judgment be given against the father, there shall be included in the costs a fee of ten dollars to such attorney.(Code 1849, c. 125, §7; Code 1860, c. 125, §7; Code 1868, c. 80, §6; 1872-3, c. 150, §6; 1882, c. 54, §6; Code 1923, c. 80, §6.)
Article 8. Desertion or Nonsupport of Wife or Child.
Revisers’ Note.—Although this article pertains to a criminal proceeding, it is placed in this chapter because its primary purpose is to compel a husband or parent to support his wife and/or children, as the case may be. Sections 16c(3) and 16c(8), c. 144, Code 1923, are omitted by c. 73, Acts 1925, and therefore repealed by implication.
§1. Offense; Penalty.—Any husband who shall, without just cause, desert or willfully neglect or refuse to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife, in destitute and necessitous circumstances, or any parent who shall, without lawful excuse, desert or willfully or neglect or refuse to provide for the support and maintenance of his or her legitimate or il legitimate child or children, under the age of sixteen years, in destitute and necessitous circumstances, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding one year, with hard labor, or both, and the court may also direct the county court to cause such husband or parent to labor on the roads or other public improvements of the county, for which it shall allow the sum of not less than one nor more than two dollars per day (but no such allowance shall be construed as a fine or part of the sentence of the court), and such allowance shall be paid by the county court to the wife or other guardian, curator, custodian or trustee of such minor child or children, as the court may order.[1901, c. 13, §1; 1917, c. 51, §1; Code 1923, c. 144, §16c (1); 1925, c. 73, §1.]
§2. Complaint and Warrant; Costs; Jurisdiction.—Proceedings under this article may be instituted upon complaint made under oath or affirmation by the wife, child or children, or by any other person who may be cognizant of the facts, before any justice of the peace of the county in which such wife, child or children may be, and upon such complaint the justice shall issue a warrant without pay if such wife, child or children are pecuniarily unable to pay for the same, and it shall be the duty of the constable to serve such warrant, and in case the warrant is issued and served as aforesaid, the justice shall have the right to require the defendant to pay the costs of the proceeding, in addition to the penalty hereinbefore provided. Juvenile, circuit, intermediate and criminal courts shall have original, concurrent and appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under this article.[1901, c. 13, §2; 1917, c. 51, §2; Code 1923, c. 144, §16c(2); 1925, c. 73, §2.]
§3. Order for Support; Release on Bond; Forfeiture.—The justice of the peace before whom such conviction is had, may, in lieu of the penalty herein provided, or in addition thereto, having regard to the circumstances and financial ability or earning capacity of the defendant, require the defendant to pay a certain sum periodically to the wife of other guardian, curator, custodian or trustee of such wife, child or children, which shall be subject to change from time to time as circumstances may require, and may release the defendant upon his or her entering into bond with good surety in the penalty of not less than five hundred dollars. The condition of the bond shall be to make payments as aforesaid, until the child or children arrive at the age of sixteen years, and to appear before the court in case default be made in the payment of such sums, and in case the defendant fails to make such payments, the justice may forthwith rearrest the defendant, and proceed with the trial under the original charge, or sentence him or her under the original charge, as the case may be, and in case of forfeiture of the bond herein provided for, and enforcement thereof, the sum recovered may, in the discretion of the court wherein the forfeiture is enforced, be paid in whole or in part to the wife or other guardian, curator, custodian or trustee of such minor child or children, as the court may order.[1917, c. 51, §§4, 5; Code 1923, c. 144, §§16c(4), (5); 1925, c. 75, §3.]
§4. Appeal; Bond; Reconviction.—If, at the trial, any husband, person or parent shall be found guilty of a violation of the provisions of this article, and desires to appeal from the decision of the justice trying such case, he shall give bond in the penalty of not less than five hundred dollars, with the condition that he shall appear before the court to which he appeals, and if, upon trial on appeal, the defendant is again found guilty of such charge, the payments to the wife, child or children, as the case may be, fixed by the justice of the peace, shall relate back to the date of the appeal, and such bond shall be liable for the payments of such sums, and judgment may be entered thereon against the defendant and his surety.(1925, c. 73, §4.)
§5. Evidence; Witnesses.—No other or greater evidence shall be required to prove the marriage of such husband and wife, or that the defendant is the father or that the alleged mother is the mother of such child or children, than is or shall be required to prove such facts in a civil action. In prosecutions under this article both husband and wife shall be competent witnesses to testify against each other in regard to any and all relevant matters, including the fact of such marriage, and the parentage of such child or children. Proof of the desertion of such wife, child or children, in destitute and necessitous circumstances, or neglect or refusal to provide for the support and maintenance of such wife, child or children, shall be prima facie evidence that such desertion, neglect or refusal, is willful.[1917, c. 51, §6; Code 1923, c. 144, §16c(6); 1925, c. 73, §5.]
§6. Venue; Extradition.—An offense under this article shall be held to have been committed in any county in which such husband, parent, wife, child or children may be at the time such desertion, refusal, neglect or failure to provide, or any part thereof, took place, or where the offender may be at the time such complaint is made. It shall be the duty of the county court, in any case in which application is properly made by the officers responsible for the execution of this article, to provide the funds necessary for extraditing any person charged with an offense under this article, who has gone to another state, and desertion or nonsupport of wife, child or children, shall be an extraditable offense under this article.[1917, c. 51, §7; Code 1923, c. 144, §16c(7); 1925, c. 73, §6.]